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Abstract 
 
Over the last twenty years, technical controls for information security have advanced 
and matured considerably. Despite these technical advances, information security 
breaches still occur on a regular basis. It appears that technical security controls 
have evolved faster than management controls. Despite efforts at promoting 
information security awareness there is evidence that human behaviour remains a 
potential vulnerability in any information security system.  
 
This thesis presents an alternate perspective of the “human problem” and assesses 
information security awareness as a management control by applying principles of 
Psychology and Marketing. Psychology and Marketing principles show significant 
opportunities for a more holistic approach to information security awareness. The 
methodology identified for Mental Models shows significant promise in mapping 
existing audience beliefs and attitudes. The use of punishment sanctions is reviewed 
and reveals an unintended consequence that people have an incentive not to report 
an information security breach. A case study is presented for an organisation that 
has used rewards to motivate compliance behaviour instead of relying on fear 
sanctions.  
 
An analysis of relevant Marketing principles identifies Direct Marketing as a 
methodology closely aligned with the goals of information security awareness. The 
importance of audience research, measuring existing attitudes and beliefs and 
finding quantifiable metrics all have important implications for information security 
awareness.  
 
Two models were created as part of this thesis. The first one in Chapter Two 
illustrates the steps involved in achieving a behavioural change and demonstrates 
the number of potential barriers that need to be considered. The second model in 
Chapter Five is a scorecard that information security professionals can use to 
evaluate the extent to which an information security awareness campaign takes into 
account Psychology and Marketing principles. While both models offer significant 
opportunities to help refine approaches to information security awareness it will be 
difficult to quantify the benefit until improvements are made to the way that 
organisations measure the success of information security awareness. 
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“I'm watching a DVD the other day. A Horror DVD. Hostel Part One. It’s about men 
being tortured to death in an underground bunker for the pleasure of others…I'm 
about to watch this film and before I watch it I have to sit through the DVD piracy 
warning…It’s the patronising nature of it. They go: You wouldn't steal a handbag. You 
wouldn't steal a car. So why would you steal a movie? 
 
And I'm sitting there going, don't tell me what I would or wouldn't do. You don't know 
me. I’m drunk at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. In my pants. I'm about to watch women be 
tortured to death in an underground bunker in eastern Europe and you're telling me I 
wouldn't nick a poxy handbag? I think you don't know me very well at all sir.” 
 
 
Ed Byrne, Mock the Week 
BBC 9th Aug 2008 
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1. Introduction - The Human Problem 
 
1.1. Background 
 
“Human error rather than flawed technology is the root cause of most security 
breaches” Deloitte Global Security Survey 2005 [DEL-05] 
 
“… the greatest root cause of external breaches continues to be the human factor” 
Deloitte Global Security Survey 2007 [DEL-07] 
 
Human behaviour contributing to information security breaches is a serious problem. 
It appears that the design and implementation of technical security controls has 
evolved faster than management controls. Despite efforts at promoting information 
security awareness there is evidence that human behaviour remains a potential 
vulnerability in any information security system.  
 
Over the last twenty years, technical controls for information security systems have 
matured considerably. Compared to twenty or even ten years ago there is now an 
amazing variety of technical security controls: 
• Firewalls running on desktops and laptops 
• Real time antivirus scanning on networks and computing devices 
• Advanced techniques to inspect and control internet traffic 
• Local disk encryption 
 
However, given all these technical advances we have not witnessed the extinction of 
the information security breach. Passwords are written down by humans and put at 
risk of disclosure. Confidential information is copied to removable media by humans 
and lost. Sensitive personal data is sent over the internet by humans without using 
encryption.  
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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1.2. Rationale 
 
One of the ways that organisations attempt to manage information security risk 
caused by human behaviour is by implementing information security awareness 
programmes [RC-06], [HR-05]. Information security awareness is a form of 
management control which is intended to achieve prevention and mitigation. 
Prevention, in that information security awareness seeks to avoid situations where a 
security incident is allowed to happen and mitigation, in that information security 
awareness seeks to limit the impact of an incident when it occurs.  
 
All organisations appear to be at some degree of risk from human interactions with 
their information systems. Unfortunately, it is hard to consider an information system 
that does not have a human component. Design, implementation and operation are 
all part of an information processing lifecycle that is exposed to the “human problem”.  
 
Human vulnerabilities are defined by the Human Vulnerabilities Special Interest 
Group as: 
 
“Human behaviour that creates a vulnerability in the system, or allows an attacker 
into the system, or allows an attacker to exploit a vulnerability” [KTN-07]. 
 
Opinions [MA-06], [BBJ-04], [PS-07] have been expressed that information security 
awareness is often ineffective at managing human information security risks. This 
thesis examines the effectiveness of information security awareness using the 
disciplines of Psychology and Marketing.  
 
Psychology is a discipline covering cognition and motivation [GR-05] and seeks to 
improve our understanding of human behaviour. 
 
Marketing is a discipline covering communications and the creation of customer 
demand [BP-08]. Marketing has the ability to improve communication methods in an 
information security context. 
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How humans process and respond to security messages and the methods used to 
communicate are key ingredients when implementing information security awareness 
[MA-06]. This thesis will review the implications of Psychology and Marketing in an 
information security context and make recommendations for improvements. 
 
1.3. Scope 
For the purposes of this thesis an “information security policy” is defined as a 
documented record of an organisation’s intention to control and communicate 
information security risk [PT-04].  
 
“Awareness” is defined as the process by which an organisation communicates the 
information security policy to individuals or groups that need to be cognisant of some 
or all of its contents [LT-05].  
 
These definitions will be expanded further in Chapter Two. The concept of an 
organisation is deliberately left open to include any situation where owners of an 
information system need to influence human behaviour. An organisation could be a 
listed company, a government body or even an internet banking site that needs to 
educate its users. 
 
1.4. A Question of Effectiveness 
If human error remains the primary cause of security breaches, does this mean the 
current approach to information security awareness campaigns is ineffective or sub-
optimal in some way? “Effectiveness” in this context is interpreted as the degree to 
which a method achieves its objectives. Angus McIlwraith criticised the effectiveness 
of information security awareness in his publication “Information Security and 
Employee Behaviour”: 
 
“Information security ‘awareness’ has been promoted for many years as being 
fundamental to information security practice. In reality, it is something that is often 
done poorly – so much so that I have seen very limited progress since I started in 
information security over 20 years ago.” [MA-06] 
 
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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In light of McIlwraith’s comments and the Deloitte survey it appears a problem 
persists with managing human behaviour, despite the effort organisations may have 
put into their information security awareness.  There could be many possible reasons 
for this including one or more combinations of the following: 
 
1. A Lack of Investment: The first possibility is that organisations have not 
invested sufficient resources creating and developing information security 
awareness. This implies that security awareness is effective but has not been 
funded to an efficient level. “Efficient” in this context is being interpreted as the 
optimal allocation of resources for maximum benefit – in this case it is an 
implied under-funding. The lack of investment in information security 
awareness appears to be a view common to information security professionals 
[HR-05], [HM-08]. Monique Hogervorst offers an explanation for this apparent 
lack of funding:  
 
“Information security training and awareness is not recognised as a contributor 
to security.” [HM-08] 
 
There is an apparent contradiction in however in Hogervorst’s position. She 
also states that: 
 
“Security awareness is probably the most significant single defence measure 
that any company can institute.” [HM-08] 
 
If information security and awareness is as beneficial as Hogervorst says it is, 
then why isn’t it more in demand? Presumably when Hogervorst laments the 
lack of recognition she is referring to the budget holders who are expected to 
fund information security awareness. Does it make sense to state that 
information security awareness is so valuable and yet at the same time so 
under-recognised? This appears to represent an asymmetric perspective of 
value between security professionals and the budget holders. Why would 
information security professionals apparently value information security 
awareness more than those who are asked to fund it? There could be two 
possible reasons for this: 
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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Does the perception that information security awareness is not a contributor to 
security stem from a lack of actual value from the activity? This might be the 
logical conclusion from McIlwraith’s observation that information security policy 
and awareness is “…often done poorly.” [MA-06] 
 
Or, is it the case that the benefit of information security awareness is difficult to 
quantify which contributes to a lack of perceived value? Information security 
awareness can be performed at a fixed point in time (such as for inductions for 
new staff [RC-06]) or it can be included as part of an ongoing campaign (such 
as monthly newsletters [RC-06]), or a combination of the two. If a security 
event can go unrecognized (either as a success or as a failure), then how 
practical is it to link the results to a concept as abstract as awareness?  
 
It is also difficult to recognise the value of prevention. Here, McIlwraith notes 
the problem with justifying spending on a non-event: 
 
“Asking people to invest in security is extremely difficult because the returns 
are rarely the same as those you would get from a standard cost-benefit 
analysis of a business opportunity. This is because the returns are uncertain, 
and the benefits are measured in events that have not happened rather than 
positive benefits that can be obtained.” [MA-06] 
 
McIlwraith is correct that there are significant difficulties in measuring benefits 
from information security expenditure. However, if budget holders show a 
reluctance to fund information security awareness it is up to information 
security professionals to make the value of information security awareness 
more obvious.  
 
2. Lack of Effective Methods: The second possible explanation for a lack of 
greater success for information security awareness is that the current 
approach to managing human behaviour in information systems been 
ineffective. Not being “effective” in this context means that the method 
employed has not been optimised to the task being attempted. This is the key 
point that this thesis attempts to evaluate. If the goal of security awareness is 
to influence human behaviour then disciplines specialising in the study of 
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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influencing human behaviour such as Psychology and Marketing offer an 
opportunity to review the effectiveness of information security awareness.  
 
The effectiveness of information security awareness is a topic of significant 
discussion, very little of it empirical as acknowledged by Jeff Bock-Brown: 
 
“…few studies have attempted to measure the effectiveness of information 
security awareness training. There is, I suspect, frequently an intuitive 
assumption made, that raising awareness leads to inevitably to a security-
enhancing change in behaviour. The association may not be that simple.” 
[BBJ-04] 
 
It seems that there has been limited research into the effectiveness and 
efficiency of information security awareness. Instead, much of the debate is 
heavily subjective and based on the assumption that awareness will equal 
security:  
 
“Raising awareness is the single most effective thing that an information 
security practitioner can do to make a positive difference to their organization.” 
[MA-06] 
 
“The more personnel know about information security and privacy issues, 
requirements and impacts, the more you will be assured of success with 
implementing security policy and awareness measures, complying with 
applicable regulations, and having business success with information security 
and privacy goals.” [HR-05] 
 
However, in the midst of this enthusiasm for information security awareness, 
Bock-Brown sounds a note of caution: 
 
“Many authors and organisations emphasise the necessity and importance of 
good security awareness throughout an organisation. None of these papers 
encouraging awareness-raising offer empirical evidence that the techniques 
discussed (largely conventional training) are effective in changing behaviour.” 
[BBJ-04] 
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Bock-Brown raises an important point about the lack of metrics to demonstrate 
effectiveness. However, the lack of metrics does not stop other authors from 
making bold claims about information security awareness. Hogervorst states 
that: 
 
“…information security training and awareness is a very cost effective counter 
measure to put in place as a protective control against the threats modern 
organizations face.” [HM-08]  
 
However, Hogervorst does not offer any empirical evidence for this statement 
beyond her own perspective as an information security trainer. 
 
Another information security practitioner perspective is available from Rebecca 
Herold: 
 
“For the past 25 or so years that I have been closely involved in information 
security, security awareness training has been the most valuable yet the most 
overlooked and under funded mechanism for improving the implementation of 
information security.” [HR-05] 
 
Herold does not offer any empirical evidence to support her view that 
information security awareness is the most “valuable” type of security control 
or what measure this claim could be evaluated by.  
 
Measuring security incidents as a baseline is difficult. Security failures are not 
always obvious [SB-06]. Arguably, there are more “silent failures” than visible 
failures and it is not necessarily in the interest of all organisations to report 
security incidents. For example, organisations with a listed share price have 
an incentive not to report security incidents because revealing a security 
breach could damage investor confidence. 
 
Ideally, the decision to implement any security control, technical or 
managerial, should be on a cost benefits basis [SB-06]. The basic premise 
being that an expenditure on a security control is justified by a reduction in 
risk. Layton criticises the lack of metrics as a risk in itself: 
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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“Management is expecting people to act and behave in a manner that 
supports organizational polices, standards guidelines and procedures. How 
can management in good faith assume their users will support their policies, if 
there are no tools in place to measure their user’s acceptance and 
internalization of their policy messages?” [LT-05] 
 
The problem is that the benefit of information security awareness is difficult to 
measure. Traditionally, benefits have been inferred by measuring the 
awareness component through surveys, questionnaires and interviews. The 
difficulty with this is that it is the change in human behaviour that delivers a 
benefit to the organisation [MA-06]. The change of awareness is only a 
prerequisite to behaviour change. The problem with awareness not always 
corresponding with a change in behaviour is explored in Chapter Three. 
 
Surveys are a traditional method of measuring awareness [RC-06]. However, 
measuring attitudes and awareness have a poor correlation with behaviour:  
 
“…the relationship between people’s attitudes and their behaviour is less than 
perfect. An example is our reaction to the invasion of privacy of the rich and 
famous by the media. When public attitudes about such invasions are 
surveyed the outcome is very clear – between 70 per cent and 80 per cent say 
they are against such acts. Yet every newspaper editor knows that sales will 
rise considerably if they print such material.” [MP-04] 
 
A number of reasons could be behind this apparent inconsistency. Bias can 
interfere with survey results. Responder bias occurs when the responder 
answers questions according to their expectations of what the survey taker is 
looking for. Confirmation bias is where the reviewer looks for evidence to 
support their expectations. Unfortunately, a number of information security 
authors [HR-05], [MA-06] still recommend surveys as a primary measure of 
information security awareness effectiveness.  
 
3. Limited Cost Benefits: The third possible explanation for a lack of greater 
success for information security awareness is that excessive demands are 
being placed on the users of information systems. An implication of the two 
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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options above is that the expectations for humans are unrealistic. It may be 
that the level of security awareness that is expected to result from information 
security awareness activities is not cost efficient given the means that we have 
to obtain it.  
 
Is the complexity of systems increasing the awareness requirements 
demanded of information system users? If systems were more intuitive for 
their users then would they make fewer mistakes? Fewer mistakes leading to 
information security breaches would mean that less training and awareness 
was required. This is the view of researchers such as Sasse et al [SA-01b] 
who have concluded that information security demands on users are 
excessively complex and helps drive an increasing demand for awareness 
and training. 
 
It does appear that improving the efficiency of information security awareness 
offers the opportunity to save costs or reach greater levels of risk reduction. 
Jeff Bock-Brown notes a relationship between system design and training 
costs in his review of information security and human factors: 
 
“Understanding how people interact with information security systems can 
facilitate the reduction of anthropogenic information security costs…” [BBJ-04] 
 
So system design is relevant to the level of information security awareness 
that is required to operate a system securely. However, the focus of this thesis 
will be on awareness methods, not calculating the level of awareness required 
for a given information system. 
 
There appears to be support for all three options having an impact on the success of 
information security awareness. In theory, these questions could be solved with the 
analysis of relevant metrics. Unfortunately, there appears to be a lack of 
methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of information security awareness which 
will be explored further in Chapter Two.  
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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1.5. Those Unpredictable Humans 
 “…Mathematics is logical; people are erratic, capricious and barely comprehensible.” 
[SB-04]  
 
At the heart of Bruce Schneier’s observation in his book “Secrets and Lies” is the 
notion of predictability. Mathematical logic is subject to a high degree of prediction, 
therefore computers operating on mathematical logic are subject to a high degree of 
prediction. People, characterised as “erratic” and “capricious” are not subject to the 
same degree of prediction.  Yet don’t humans also follow some kind of logic? Logic is 
an instruction operating within a set of parameters and variables. Do humans also 
have a similar set of parameters that influence the outcome of an instruction? What 
would those parameters be for a human with a phobia of spiders? We could call such 
a phobia “illogical”, but would our perspective as external observers not be entirely 
subjective?  
 
“Many of the behaviours we don’t want to see happen are in fact predictable, but only 
if you take the time to understand how people come to make decisions.” [MA-06] 
 
If the parameters of the human system were better understood might some 
apparently illogical actions start to make sense? What logic does a human follow 
when deciding to write down a password? What experiences and learning created 
the process which culminated in the action? As security professionals we can be 
swift to blame the users. To what extent is this an external perspective which exists 
because of a failure to understand the variables that created the action? Rather than 
blaming the user, should the system designer be criticised? Perhaps the focus needs 
to be on improving our understanding of human behaviour in an information security 
context?  
 
There are a range of reasons why information security incidents occur. This thesis 
focuses on awareness and the factors that impact the likelihood or severity of 
incidents with a significant human element as a cause. Information security incidents 
include: 
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1. Deliberate breaches of security policy. This situation occurs when the 
information security “rules” are known. It is a problem of optimum motivation - 
deliberate breaches occur because an individual or group has been motivated 
to breach policy more than they have been motivated to comply.  
 
2. Accidental breaches of security policy caused by a lack of awareness. 
This category of breach happens when a lack of knowledge about technology 
or risk causes individuals or groups to take actions which expose the 
organisation to risk of an incident.  
  
3. Accidental errors that occur despite the presence of awareness and 
adequate motivation. These include slips (when an action is performed 
incorrectly) and lapses (when a required action is missed) [BBJ-04]. This is a 
significant issue with researchers such as Sasse et al [SA-01b] examining the 
extent to which usability problems contribute to information security breaches. 
This third category is acknowledged as important when examining the causes 
of information security breaches but will not be covered in this thesis. Instead, 
this thesis will be concentrating on perception, communication and motivation 
of users, not the degree to which systems have been optimised for human 
use. 
 
As directly measuring the effectiveness of security awareness is a significant 
challenge and beyond the scope of this thesis an alternate approach will be used. 
Principles of Psychology and Marketing relevant to the effectiveness of information 
security awareness will be identified. The implications of these principles will be 
explored in an information security context and used to create a qualitative scorecard 
for an information security awareness review. Although the findings will not constitute 
an empirical measurement of information security awareness, the findings should 
present an alternative to the current methods of measuring awareness. 
 
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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1.6. Motivation 
The motivation for this thesis was a personal interest in the possibility that disciplines 
outside of information security such as Psychology and Marketing might hold some of 
the answers to the human security problem.  
 
Firstly, could Psychology help explain the mystery of apparently irrational human 
decisions when faced with information security choices? Why does the human 
decision making process appear prone to failure when faced with decisions that 
require an evaluation of risk? Individuals are more aware than ever about the range 
of security threats that could impact information systems such as identity thieves, 
viruses and hackers. Yet has this growing awareness translated into safer 
behaviour? What is the link between awareness and behaviour? Would information 
security awareness be more effective if human behaviour was better understood by 
the designers and implementers of information security awareness programmes? 
 
Secondly, what could the Marketing profession teach information security 
professionals about influencing an audience? If information security awareness was 
implemented as a Marketing campaign what would it look like? Drink driving and stop 
smoking campaigns have many parallels to information security awareness – they 
both seek to influence human behaviour to reduce risk. What could public Marketing 
campaigns such as “Think! Road Safety” teach information security professionals? 
 
Human computer interaction (HCI) is another field of research which helps to explain 
why humans fail to perform information security tasks correctly. This is highly relevant 
but due to space and time constraints will not be covered in detail in this thesis which 
is focusing on Psychology and Marketing principles. Where relevant, HCI concepts 
and impacts are acknowledged.  
Introduction – The Human Problem 
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1.7. Chapter Summary 
Information security awareness is one of the main ways that organisations attempt to 
manage the human risk to information systems. A number of potential problems have 
been identified with this approach: 
1. Opinions have been expressed that the value of information security 
awareness has not been adequately recognised 
2. There is very little research available to measure the impact of information 
security awareness 
3. Partly as a consequence from the lack of metrics, it is difficult to judge if the 
current methods of implementing information security awareness are effective 
(using a method likely to achieve maximum impact) 
 
This thesis aims to help answer to these questions by: 
1. Identifying principles of Psychology and Marketing relevant to the 
effectiveness of information security awareness 
2. Analysing the impact of these principles on information security awareness 
3. Creating a qualitative scoring system for reviewing approaches to information 
security awareness using principles of Psychology and Marketing 
4. Reporting on the results of a survey to measure information security attitudes 
and beliefs 
5. Identifying any patterns which can be presented as findings relevant for 
information security professionals 
 
Chapter Two examines the concept of information security awareness in more detail 
and examines key concepts such as effectiveness. 
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2. Defining the Problem 
 
2.1. Definitions 
Before a discussion about the effectiveness of information security awareness can 
take place it is necessary to expand on the definitions of three key concepts:  
• Information Security Policy  
• Information Security Awareness 
• Effectiveness 
 
2.2. Information Security Policy 
An information security policy is normally a written document that provides 
centralised control for information security risk management efforts [PT-04]. ISO 
27001, the international standard on Information Security Management Systems 
(ISMS) defines the objective of an information security policy as:  
 
“To provide management direction and support for information security in accordance 
with business requirements and relevant laws and regulations.” [PT-04] 
 
Some organisations implement a security policy as part of an ISMS although it is 
important to acknowledge that not all organisations implement all components of an 
ISMS. The definition above appears to be a common one which is shared by security 
practitioners such as Thomas R Peltier:  
 
“Management establishes its goals and objectives for protecting the assets of the 
enterprise by implementing policies. Policies are used to introduce the concepts of 
what is expected of all employees when using enterprise assets and what non-
compliance can lead to.” [PT-04] 
 
All organisations have information security risks to their existence or operations 
which information security awareness helps mitigate such as: 
• The risk of losing money 
• The risk of regulatory sanction
Defining the Problem 
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• The risk of negative publicity 
• The risk of extinction 
• The risk of injury or death 
 
Security policies are becoming more common for organisations. According to the 
2008 BERR study, 55% of organisations polled reported having a documented 
security policy. This is up from 27% in 2002. Large businesses (defined as having 
over 500 staff) were far more likely to have a documented security policy. 
 
There are many reasons why an organisation might have an information security 
policy and publicise it through an awareness programme. Therefore, there are many 
definitions of what a successful implementation of policy and awareness would be. 
These reasons and benefits are explored in this chapter. A common theme, 
important to the rationale of this thesis, is that the expected consequence of an 
organisation’s investment in security awareness is a net reduction in risk caused by 
the human element. In real terms this means that there will be a tangible result such 
as a change in behaviour for users of an information system of which the outcome is 
an improvement of security [RC-06], [LT-05], [HR-05]. 
 
The reasons for publishing an information security policy include: 
• An expectation that users modify their behaviour in a way that benefits the 
organisation’s information security risk profile 
• Demonstrating to external entities such as an industry regulator that 
information security is being managed appropriately 
• Providing a degree of control over employment contracts. Employees that 
violate the policy can be subject to disciplinary action 
 
Influencing the behaviour of information system users is not the only reason why an 
organisation might decide to implement an information security awareness 
programme. It could be required to meet regulatory compliance requirements [HR-05] 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Or, it could be that external stakeholders such as 
customers and business partners need evidence that the organisation is serious 
about information security [MA-06]. 
 
Defining the Problem 
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The focus of this thesis will be on introducing information security awareness to 
influence the human element in an attempt to achieve a risk reduction. Tolerances to 
risk will be unique to each organisation and its activities and therefore the degree of 
human risk reduction required will also be unique for each organisation. 
 
The implementation of an information security policy normally means finding a 
balance between controlling threats to information systems and not unduly restricting 
the organisation’s information processing activities. 
 
The concept of perfect security is not the same as risk removal. An attempt to 
remove all risks would likely mean permanently locking buildings and barring all staff, 
including guards [SB-04]. Computers would be unplugged from networks and 
isolated. Under these circumstances it would become impossible for an organisation 
to achieve its objectives. Information technology is a tool to aid achievement of 
objectives and information security must not remove information technology’s value 
as a tool. Schneier supports this view: 
 
“Every security system has costs and requires trade-offs…We don’t have limitless 
resources or infinite patience. As individuals and a society, we need to do the things 
that make the most sense, that are most effective for use of our security dollar.” 
 [SB-06] 
 
Typically, an information security policy is: 
• A centralised way of communicating information security knowledge 
throughout an organisation. A particular organisation’s policy is communicated 
so that users can adapt their behaviour appropriate to the organisation 
• Demonstration of commitment by management to manage risks inherent in 
information processing 
• A definition of responsibilities for information security within the organisation. 
Responsibilities are communicated so that roles such as managers or system 
administrators can understand specifically what they need to do to support 
information security 
• A communication of the overall tolerance to information security risk within the 
organisation. Overall risk tolerance is communicated to influence how users 
react when confronted with high risk situations 
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• A set of high level controls and procedures designed to achieve appropriate 
risk management within the organisation. Risk management processes are 
communicated to influence what users do to manage risks 
 
It is important to note however that some organisations publish information security 
policies partly because of a requirement for legal or regulatory compliance [HR-05]. 
In some cases it is a value in itself being able to demonstrate that information has 
been communicated. The change in behaviour was not required or essential to the 
process.  
 
2.3. Information Security Awareness 
Information security awareness is the publication and presentation of elements of an 
organisation’s security policy to an audience.  
 
A review of information security awareness publications [NIST-A], [HR-05], [LT-05] 
has found a broad consensus for three layers of information security publication to an 
audience: 
1. Information security awareness 
2. Information security training 
3. Information security education 
 
All users receive some form of awareness, some users receive training for specific 
tasks and those involved in administering information security receive education. 
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The National Institute for Standards and Training (NIST) defines the following 
relationships [NIST-A] between training components: 
 
NIST Awareness, Training and Education diagram [NIST-A] 
 
The information security awareness business case appears to rest on the 
expectation that improving awareness will improve security [HM-08]. This assumption 
has come into criticism with authors such as Angus McIlwraith [MA-06] and Timothy 
Layton [LT-05].  
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NIST’s original information security awareness document “SP 500-172” did not 
specifically reference behaviour. The original description was: 
 
“(Creating) the employee’s sensitivity to the threats and vulnerabilities of computer 
systems…” [DS-08] 
 
NIST’s updated 2003 publication “Building an Information Technology Security 
Awareness and Training Program” has a new emphasis on the behavioural 
component by introducing a verb into the description: 
  
“Awareness presentations are intended to allow individuals to recognize IT security 
concerns and respond accordingly.” [NIST-B] 
 
NIST now recognise that the success of information security awareness rests on an 
action or inaction. This is the “respond” component in their definition. The original 
reference to “sensitivity” was an internal property that potentially existed independent 
of the individual’s actual behaviour.  
 
As well as achieving a behaviour component, information security awareness is also 
about creating a consistent approach. As organisations increase in size it becomes 
more challenging to retain a consistent cohesive information security strategy. 
Individuals within an organisation separated by geography and function would likely 
adopt different attitudes to information security. The Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (formerly the Department of Trade and Industry) 
takes the following view:  
 
“As companies grow, previous methods of communication can become less effective. 
For example, informal understandings and chats in the corridor can prove insufficient. 
Legal and regulatory pressures increase as companies expand. Providing the entire 
company with clear, concise, internal governance can bring real benefits in terms of 
efficiency as well as a means of reducing information risk.” [DTI-06] 
 
Clearly, the rationale for awareness is that it changes the variables in a human logic 
process. For example, if users are aware of the potential for fines to result from 
installing unlicensed software the expectation would be that they are less likely to 
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install software on their own initiative. If users were aware of the potential impact that 
could result from the loss of personal data on a USB key they might be more careful.  
 
2.4. Effectiveness 
This thesis has found widespread support for the effectiveness of information security 
awareness to be judged by the extent to which it results in optimal behaviour by 
information system users [LT-05], [RC-06], [HR-05]: 
 
“…it’s not what people know, or feel, or are aware of that is the final determinant of 
the quality of security – its what they do. If the purpose of security education is to 
establish, enhance and maintain quality security, we should keep our eyes firmly 
fixed on performance.” [RC-06] 
 
Traditionally, the way of measuring security policy effectiveness has been by using 
surveys which measure reported awareness [HR-05]. Unfortunately, it appears that 
using people’s intentions to comply with a policy as a predictor of behaviour is fraught 
with problems: 
 
“Security managers and senior management assumes that the majority of their users 
will verbally agree with their policies. They also know this is the standard response 
they will receive no matter how their users really feel.” [LT-05] 
 
Layton’s position is that individuals might respond to a survey and deliberately mis-
state their intention to comply. Other critics are concerned that there is an 
unconscious discrepancy between attitudes and behaviour. Authors such as 
McIlwraith [MA-06] in the information security field, and Makin and Cox [MP-04] from 
an organisational behaviour viewpoint have stated that the link between awareness 
and behaviour is weak. Looking outside the information security discipline there are 
numerous examples of widespread awareness that has not resulted in optimal 
behaviour. 
• Smoking: it is likely that most smokers are aware of the health impact from 
smoking, yet their behaviour continues. Not only is their behaviour not 
consistent with their awareness (or knowledge) but their cognitive process to 
Defining the Problem 
© Geordie Stewart 2008 Page 27 of 104 
rationalise the risk is apparently selective. The concept of risk rationalisation 
will be explored further in Chapter Three. 
• Drink Driving: the risks and consequences have been extensively 
communicated for a generation of television viewers yet drink driving is still a 
social problem. In 1979, the first year that drink driving statistics were recorded 
there were 1640 fatalities [DFT-A]. In 2003, the latest reported year there were 
560. While this is a significant drop in fatalities, drink driving remains a 
problem even after millions of pounds have been spent on awareness for 
radio, television and print. Does this result suggest that 100% compliance in 
eliminating drink driving is impossible?  
 
At the heart of the debate about information security awareness effectiveness is the 
lack of reliable metrics to prove the assertions of either side. Authors such as 
McIlwraith [MA-06] have criticised poor choices of metrics to measure effectiveness. 
Other authors such as Roper et al [RC-06] complain that the measurement 
component is often “…neglected or given little thought” [RC-06]. There is little doubt 
that this lack of metrics will contribute to ongoing difficulties justifying spending on 
information security awareness. 
 
In the absence of reliable metrics it is difficult to estimate the degree to which 
different approaches impact the success of information security awareness. The 
problem is that information security awareness can come from multiple sources. 
Failures could be attributed to the organisation’s lack of action while successes could 
be the result of awareness communicated from other sources such as previous 
organisations, personal experiences at home or mass media sources such as the 
BBC [BBC-B]. The organisation’s actions in promoting information security 
awareness may have actually been inconsequential. 
 
In evaluating effectiveness, there are a number of reasons why information security 
awareness might not impact behaviour, even if the target audience has been 
exposed to an opportunity for learning. Achieving a change in behaviour is more 
complex than just the communication of “facts”.  
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Publications [MM-02], [HR-05], [LT-05], [MA-06], [RC-06], [SP-02] on information 
security awareness programmes have been reviewed to create a model to show the 
steps contingent to a successful behavioural outcome. It helps illustrate reasons why 
information security awareness may have a declining effectiveness. Each stage 
represents a possibility for diminishing returns: 
 
 
 
Model to show steps contingent to a behavioural outcome © Geordie Stewart 
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Step One is the selection of information security content. A review of publications 
shows two distinct approaches to this. It can be done as a product of a risk 
assessment where specific behaviours have been identified as a source of risk for 
the organisation [MA-06], or, content can be selected by aligning with best practice or 
regulatory requirements [HR-05]. Although there may be some merit in a best 
practices approach this risks loosing audience focus. The importance of developing 
content specifically relevant to the audience is discussed in step three.  
 
Step Two is the presentation of communication to an audience for the opportunity for 
learning to take place. It is likely that in any information security awareness 
programme a percentage of the audience will not be exposed to awareness material. 
At any point in time it is likely that some staff will be absent or otherwise unavailable. 
An example is geography whereby head office staff might receive more training than 
other locations [MA-06]. 
 
Step Three involves the audience drawing the right conclusions after being 
presented with the awareness material. The role of existing perceptions interfering 
with risk communications is reviewed in Chapter Three which examines the Mental 
Model approach recommended by Morgan et al [MM-02]. 
 
Information security is a relatively new discipline even though some of the concepts 
are not. Information security awareness is sometimes created and delivered by 
information technology staff who may not be the best communicators.  
 
It is acknowledged that individuals have different learning styles [OJ-02], [EM-05] and 
each training method will suit some users and not others. Some users may benefit 
from classroom sessions and other users may prefer a hands on approach. However, 
all users need to be presented with content they can perceive as relevant. The 
Deloitte Global Security Survey 2007 makes a specific reference to the needs of the 
audience: 
 
“Organizations that are in the process of developing training and awareness 
programs need to take into account the audience. They need to provide case studies 
that the audience can relate to, not a one size fits all training program.” [DEL-07] 
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Step Four aims to motivate the audience to act on the knowledge that was conveyed 
in step three. In any communication process it is unlikely that all of the audience will 
be successfully convinced to act on a particular request or instruction. Motivation will 
be explored further in Chapter Three where it is covered as part of a review of 
Psychology principles. 
 
Step Five could result in a further decrease in training effectiveness because of 
barriers to compliance. This is when the user understands what is required of them 
and has been successfully motivated but lacks the ability to actually perform the 
behaviour. Barriers to compliance could include: 
• Lack of facilities: for example a lack of shredders enabling staff to act in 
accordance with a secure disposal policy [HR-05] 
• Excessively complex technology: researchers such as Sasse [SA-01b] 
have noted the impact of complexity on human computer interaction as a 
barrier to secure computing 
• Social barriers: some organisations have a culture where lax security is 
considered a demonstration of trust [MA-06] 
 
Step Six requires the individual to recognise a situation that the training or 
awareness applied to. Several authors [LT-05], [HR-05] have noted that security 
issues presented in training sessions may not resemble actual examples 
encountered by users. This means a very real chance that the user will fail to 
recognise the situation for which the awareness was intended. 
 
Step Seven requires the individual to perform the task correctly. In this situation the 
user is aware of the security issue, has the means and motivation to perform the 
correct action but makes a mistake. This includes slips and lapses as previously 
mentioned. 
 
This thesis focuses on steps three and four to examine factors that influence human 
awareness of risk using Psychology and Marketing doctrines. The previous steps 
were presented to acknowledge the other stages involved in reaching optimal 
behaviour. 
Defining the Problem 
© Geordie Stewart 2008 Page 31 of 104 
2.5. Chapter Summary 
Chapter Two has expanded on the form and expected purpose of information 
security awareness. Other key concepts such as policy, compliance and 
effectiveness are identified as relevant to managing human security risk.  
 
Organisations implement information security awareness for a variety of reasons but 
a common theme is to influence the behaviour of their information system users. A 
key point is raised that in order to achieve a risk reduction, awareness must translate 
into a behavioural change in order to be effective.  
 
A review of information security publications dealing with information security 
awareness has revealed a concern that current methods of information security 
awareness are not effective. If methods are not effective, there is a case that 
information security awareness is inefficient, in that the results obtained are not worth 
the cost.  
 
A model was presented in Section 2.4 to demonstrate how many factors influence 
the eventual outcome and success of delivering information security awareness.  
 
Chapter Three will review Psychology issues that impact the effectiveness of 
information security awareness methods.  
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3. Psychology and Information Security 
 
Psychology is an established discipline of academic research dealing with human 
behaviour and thought processes. It offers the opportunity for increased 
understanding and prediction of human actions through appreciating the cognitive 
functions underlying human actions. Increased understanding could be invaluable to 
information security professionals when attempting to predict the outcome of efforts 
directed at information security awareness. 
 
The goal of this chapter is to identify the key principles of Psychology which are 
directly relevant to influencing human behaviour in an information security context. 
Psychology is a large field and it is not possible to cover all areas of relevance so a 
summary is presented here. Numerous branches of Psychology exist but this thesis 
will focus on the subgroups most closely aligned with predicting behaviour including: 
1. Cognitive Psychology: uses information processing models to explain the 
thinking underlying behaviour. This includes perception, memory and problem 
solving 
2. Personality Psychology: the study of patterns of behaviour within an 
individual 
3. Industrial and Organisational Psychology: the study of humans in an 
occupational and work context 
 
Central to a review of Psychology’s relevance to information security is the debate 
about the extent to which humans can be considered rational, logical entities.  
Human behaviour has been criticised by some Psychologists as fundamentally 
irrational. When a human reaches an irrational result (usually defined as failing to 
maximise self interest through selection of available options), some Psychologists 
such as Reisberg and Watson [EM-05] argue that human reasoning is fundamentally 
flawed and cannot be regarded as rational. In contrast, other Psychologists such as 
Evans [EM-05] argue that the way we measure logic in a laboratory setting distorts 
the results and humans are actually mostly rational. Eysenck et al [EM-05] offer 
several convincing arguments of why innate human irrationality might be 
overestimated. Firstly, errors in judgment where the subject fails to select the “best” 
choice could be a product of complexity. 
Psychology and Information Security 
 
© Geordie Stewart 2008 Page 33 of 104 
Concepts involving large numbers such as “One in a million” are new in an 
evolutionary context. Schneier makes a strong case [SB-08] that humans are not well 
cognitively equipped to deal with such abstracts. Eysenck et al [EM-05] argue that if 
the problem is reframed the cognition process is significantly improved: 
 
“….findings suggest that people can think rationally when problems are presented in 
a readily understandable form not requiring extensive calculations.” [EM-05] 
 
Secondly, language interpretation differences between the subject and the 
experimenter could contribute to a difference of what a perceived logical outcome 
would be: 
 
“…the participants’ understanding of the problem may differ from that of the 
experimenter. Indeed, some participants who produce the “wrong” answer may 
actually be reasoning logically based on their interpretation of the problem.” [EM-05] 
 
In this example, the individual interpretation of language frames the perceived 
problem. Unless the experimenter and subject have exactly the same understanding 
of words used this means that the subject will not perceive exactly the same problem 
as the experimenter.  
 
The case of Eysenck et al [EM-05] for limited rationality appears to make sense. For 
the purposes of this thesis the important factor is that generally individuals attempt to 
be logical. The fact that this process is not always apparently successful does not 
mean that the notion of rational humans is invalid. Indeed, the factors causing this 
gap between illogical and logical behaviour in an information security context is part 
of the focus for this thesis. 
 
Part of the problem in the debate about humans being rational is the difficulty 
defining what it means to be rational. Eysenck et al make a strong case for “Bounded 
Rationality”: 
 
“The notion that people are as rational as their processing limitations permit.” [EM-05] 
 
Psychology and Information Security 
 
© Geordie Stewart 2008 Page 34 of 104 
This is supported by the view from Evans and Over [EM-05] that humans have two 
forms of rationality – Rationality1 and Rationality2.  
 
Rationality1 is demonstrated when: 
 
“(Humans)…are generally successful in achieving their basic goals, keeping 
themselves alive, finding their way in the world, and communicating with each other.” 
[EM-05] 
 
Rationality2 is when: 
 
“(Humans)…act with good reasons sanctioned by normative theory such as formal 
logic or probability theory.” [EM-05] 
 
This appears to demonstrate a distinction between “generally successful” behaviour 
and “best” behaviour. Rationality1 appears to explain how humans can drive cars and 
fly planes fairly reliably without widespread carnage. Their behaviour may not be 
“optimised” in a formal mathematical sense but it is enough to be “generally 
successful” in their activities.  
 
Rationality2 by contrast may partly be a behaviour which exists largely in a 
hypothetical, sterile laboratory. Humans do not have the luxury of expending infinite 
time and resources when making a decision. Examples where humans are given an 
hour to solve a problem in a test do not resemble a busy work place where time is 
limited and distractions are likely to be present.  
 
In this thesis, the concept of rational behaviour is interpreted in a Psychology context 
to mean the extent to which a decision reflects the individual’s ability to express self 
interest. This could be expressed in anything of value to the individual and would not 
necessarily be constrained to money.  
 
In Marketing there is an associated concept called “opportunity cost” which can be 
defined as:  
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“The difference between the revenues generated from undertaking one particular 
activity compared with another feasible revenue generating activity.” [BP-08] 
 
This is a definition for an organisation which is interested in maximising profits, but for 
an individual, an opportunity cost decision could mean choosing actions that could 
lead to rewards in order to achieve a perceived benefit. These benefits could be 
rewards such as avoiding work, leaving early or even a social gain such as being 
seen to be generous with colleagues. Normally in an information security context, the 
self interest that security directives appeals to as a management control would be job 
security [PT-04]. It is the threat of disciplinary action which acts as a deterrent (the 
negative outcome) that users attempt to avoid. 
 
It is necessary to acknowledge that the interests of the individual are not always the 
same as the interests of the organisation. The “best” or “acceptable” option in a 
situation for an individual is unlikely to be exactly the same as for the organisation. 
While the “best” option for the individual might be to go home early, the organisation 
might prefer a quality output. 
 
A key point is that behaviour normally achieves acceptable outcomes which are not 
necessarily optimised in a true quantitative sense. This chapter is focusing on the 
factors that might contribute to an information security incident caused by human 
cognition. 
 
3.1. Motivation 
“Practical experience as evidenced by current research studies indicate the passing 
out of security policies does little to motivate or ensure employee commitment and 
compliance. In fact, it can create negative feelings and make the users motivation 
and attitude move in a negative direction away from the intended goal of the security 
awareness program.” [LT-05] 
 
Timothy Layton’s observation is that simply asking people to comply with a directive 
may not be effective. This section explores the reasons why individuals might be 
motivated to follow an information security policy and act according to awareness or 
training. 
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Operant conditioning is an important concept that applies when an outcome or result 
is used to impact the form and occurrence of behaviour. It is described by Makin and 
Cox as “behaviour is a function of its consequences”. [MP-04] The outcome can be 
positive in some way which has a chance to increase the likelihood of the behaviour. 
Alternately, it can be negative in some way which has a chance to decrease the 
likelihood of the behaviour.  
 
Note that the process does not always have to involve the addition of stimulus. 
Positive outcomes can include the removal of unpleasant stimulus and negative 
outcomes can include the removal of pleasant stimulus. It is also important that the 
individual (or subject) is able to perceive the link between the behaviour and the 
result. Noise in the form of multiple stimuli occurring at once could prevent this 
perception with the result that if the subject is unable to perceive the link between 
behaviour and stimuli, there will not be a motivational impact on behaviour. 
Positive reinforcement is when behaviour is associated with the introduction of 
favourable stimuli which is perceived as a form of reward and causes the behaviour 
to continue. It can also increase the frequency or magnitude of the behaviour. 
Positive punishments could take the form of praise, money, attention or a variety of 
other benefits that might be perceived to be of value to an individual. 
Negative reinforcement is when behaviour is associated with a removal of unpleasant 
stimuli which is perceived as a form of reward and serves to encourage the 
behaviour in a similar way to positive reinforcement. Negative reinforcements could 
take the form of removal of unpleasant tasks which the individual does not enjoy. 
Positive punishment is when behaviour is associated with the introduction of 
unpleasant stimuli and serves to extinguish the behaviour. It can also reduce the 
frequency or magnitude of the behaviour. Positive punishments could take the form 
of ridicule from peers or warnings from a person of authority. 
Negative punishment is when behaviour is associated with the removal of pleasant 
stimuli and serves to extinguish behaviour in a similar way to positive punishment. 
Negative punishment could take the form of removing privileges such as special 
breaks or internet access. 
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Diagram to show relationships between behavioural consequences © Geordie Stewart 
 
While operant conditioning explains some of the causes for behaviour, problems 
have been identified with using operant conditions in an information security context. 
Edward Deci has challenged the assumption that rewards are the best way to 
encourage behaviour in the long term [GR-05]. Deci’s research suggests that it is the 
sense of autonomy which correlates most closely with sustaining behaviours in the 
longer term. His research also found that behaviour declined more quickly when an 
individual was expecting a reward as a result of the behaviour.  
 
One of his famous experiments was with children who were asked to draw pictures. 
One set of children were asked to draw pictures with no expectation of reward. 
Another set of children were offered a reward to draw. Interestingly, when the 
rewards were suspended, the children who had never expected a reward continued 
to draw the longest. In contrast, the children expecting a reward quickly lost interest. 
For the children drawing the pictures without expectation of an external reinforcer, 
the act of drawing itself was perceived as a reward. The implication is that the 
desired behaviour ceases quickly once the reward stops. Therefore any reward 
scheme must be sustainable in the long term if long term behaviours are required. 
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There also appears to be a relationship between the level of motivation and the 
practicality of attaining a particular goal: 
 
“Research spanning the last sixty years indicates that when a person’s perception of 
goal achievement is beyond their reach, commitment declines significantly. Hence, it 
is imperative that people believe the goal is attainable.” [LT-05] 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
When an organisation has problems with behaviour impacting information security it 
is important to recognise the implications of operant conditioning which suggests that 
all behaviour exists because it is or has been rewarded in some way: 
 
“When organisations face problems with costs, quality, productivity and attendance, 
these problems often stem from ineffective patterns of behaviour that the 
organisation is unwittingly encouraging. To prevent and stop these problems, a 
behavioural approach to managing people is often the most effective.” [MP-04] 
 
The “natural reaction” noted by Makin and Cox is to resort to the traditional stick 
approach – to punish behaviour which is considered noncompliant. It usually consists 
of pressure and cajoling from management. This approach, which is used in support 
of compliance with security management controls, may not always be the most 
effective motivator in the operant conditioning equation. Recent examples from the 
field of organisational management have shown that rewards can be powerful tools.  
 
Network Rail has had a significant challenge raising awareness of safety issues for 
staff and contractors. To address this Network Rail embarked on a major awareness 
campaign: 
 
“Safety 365 is the communications campaign that we run for all our employees 
across the whole organisation. The key issues that we cover are slips, trips & falls, 
manual handling, near misses, alcohol & drugs and occupational diseases.” 
 [NR-A] 
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Safety 365 is an interesting example from a compliance perspective because it uses 
positive reinforcement as a behavioural motivator. Pride is created through 
successfully meeting safety targets and a healthy sense of competition is fostered 
with prizes for the business areas that have the best safety record:  
 
 
Safety 365 photo taken by the author
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Results are displayed in a prominent place helping to foster the shared company 
value of a safety culture. Here, a poster is displayed in the head office in a prominent 
position near the lifts: 
 
 
Safety 365 photo taken by the author 
 
The result has been a significant decline in both accidents and predictors of 
accidents (NR-A): 
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Accident Frequency Rate 0.359 0.263 0.226 
Fatalities 4 0 2 
Major 98 69 79 
Lost Time 301 216 189 
 
This approach by Network Rail to use positive reinforcement instead of positive 
punishment is significant because of its potential impact on staff accident reporting 
rates. The principles of operant conditioning suggest that incidents are less likely to 
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be reported if the reporting results in a sanction. Incidents that are not reported 
cannot be measured and the lack of measurement inhibits the refinement and 
optimisation of processes to deal with the incidents.  
 
Therefore, by using positive reinforcement as a motivator in this scenario Network 
Rail is influencing behaviour without reducing its ability to monitor compliance 
through reported incidents. This factor is important in any situation where policy 
violations are not detected automatically and rely on a human element.  
 
Potentially, the information security approach and its frequent resort to positive 
punishments, means that many incidents go unreported for fear of sanctions.  One of 
the problems identified in the rationale of this thesis was that it is difficult obtaining 
metrics for information security because of silent failures. It is also difficult linking 
preventative controls with so many intertwined causes and effects. Organisations that 
need to improve their metrics and increase the rate of incident reporting should look 
at limiting the extent to which they employ positive punishment. Using positive 
reinforcement is still effective at influencing behaviour but will not limit incident 
reporting to the same extent as positive punishment. 
 
3.2. Reward Schedules 
Early work by Skinner [GR-05] has shown that the timing of the response in the form 
of reinforcement or punishment is a significant factor in the degree of influence that 
the response poses. Schedules of reinforcement can be fixed or variable based. 
Fixed ratio schedules of reinforcement mean that an outcome is delivered for every X 
examples of the behaviour. This is commonly written as FR(X). A variable schedule 
of reinforcement means that a consequence is provided on average once for every X 
examples of the behaviour. This is written as VR(X).  
 
Skinner helped confirm the following principles: 
1. The greater the time in between the behaviour and the reinforcement or 
punishment, the less effect the process with have on behaviour.  
2. The reinforcement or punishment does not have to occur every time the 
behaviour does in order to be effective. It can occur on a fixed variable (such 
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as one result for every ten instances of the behaviour) or on a variable basis 
(on average one result for every ten instances of the behaviour). 
3. Variable reinforcements have a greater long term effect on individuals. 
Variable reinforcements can be time based or ratio based. Research shows 
that behaviours are maintained for a longer term in variable schedules in 
comparison to fixed schedules. Makin and Cox give an example of a simulated 
computer stock market experiment [MP-04] where subjects who experienced a 
variable ratio reinforcement continued their behaviour long after other subjects 
who were on a fixed ratio of reinforcements. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
Organisations do not have to commit to rewarding users every time they comply with 
desired behaviour. Instead, a variable ratio of rewards could be used to sustain 
desired behaviour with an accordingly reduced value of expended rewards or 
resources on behalf of the organisation.  
 
One method of measuring the level of behaviour compliance with information security 
policy is by performing an audit. If time elapsed between behaviour and the response 
(triggered by an audit) is important then audits that occur infrequently, such as a 
yearly compliance audit, will have less impact on behaviour than a response that 
happens within a few days of the behaviour. The response could be a punishment for 
non-compliance or it could be a reward for successful compliance. Either way, a 
response to an action delivered up to a year after the behaviour is unlikely to act as a 
significant motivator unless the punishment is severe. The implication is that 
continuous auditing of security policy compliance is more effective at influencing 
behaviour than a yearly or quarterly approach. 
 
3.3. Reward / Punishment Asymmetry 
Experiments [MP-04] and live examples have indicated that while reinforcement can 
operate on a variable or infrequent basis and still be effective, variable punishment is 
less effective. According to Makin and Cox:  
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“The certainty of being punished has an important influence on behaviour…unless 
the behaviour can be punished every time it occurs the punishment is unlikely to 
change the behaviour.” [MP-04] 
 
Makin and Cox go on to conclude that “Punishment is not an effective way of trying to 
change behaviour” [MP-04]. This view is supported by Criminologist Tim Newbury 
[NT-07] who points out that re-offender rates are not significantly different between 
white collar workers who have been imprisoned and those who had not. Therefore, 
the generalisation that inconsistent punishments will not be effective seems to 
overestimate the role of frequency without allowing for severity of punishment. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
For sanctions to be effective the chance of being punished must be highly likely. In 
most organisations severe punishments are not practical. The exception being when 
an employee is dismissed or demoted which acts as a warning to other employees. 
In this case however the behaviour of the individual is not being impacted - it is other 
spectators within the organisation.  
 
Taking into account the findings above in Reward Schedules, the optimum support 
that can be provided for information security policy in the form of compliance is a real 
time monitoring scheme. Having a high likelihood of detection which delivers swift 
feedback to individuals will achieve maximum impact on behaviour. The “yearly audit 
approach” is useful to provide a snapshot of the security of an organisation but will 
have limited impact on behaviour unless the punishments for non-compliance are 
severe. 
 
3.4. Heuristics 
Heuristics are “Rules of thumb” [EM-05] that humans use in decision making 
processes. They are effectively a mental shortcut that allows decisions to be made 
without considering all input all of the time. “…the complexity of most problems 
means that we rely heavily on heuristics or rules of thumb.” [KM-05] 
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Heuristics can also be a source of error in the decision making process. As a mental 
model a heuristic represents a simplified abstract which will not exactly match reality. 
As such it is strongly tied to perspective. A by-product of the construction of heuristics 
is bias. 
 
Biases are the result of simplified decision making processes that can interfere with 
an individual’s ability for optimal decision making and can lead to results that can 
appear “illogical”. Normally, these decision making aids or “rules of thumb” serve us 
well. Many different biases have been identified and this section presents a summary 
of the ones most relevant to risk decisions and information security. 
 
The “availability heuristic” is a recognised source of error and inaccuracy in human 
decision making [SB-08]. Humans tend to assess the likelihood of an event by the 
ease they can imagine it. Therefore, events which have happened to the individual 
will be easier to imagine than hypothetical events. Recent events will be easier to 
recall than old ones. The degree to which an event is emotional and vivid will also be 
significant.  
 
The “affect heuristic” is a bias interfering with the accuracy of risk perception [SP-00]. 
This is where feelings and emotions distort the perception of risk severity. For 
example, where a risk is being accepted for the purpose of gaining a benefit, the risk 
tends to be downplayed. Schneier notes that this applies to comparatively risky 
sports such as skydiving [SB-08]. The perceived risk is downplayed because of the 
emotional attachment to the activity. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
It is important to acknowledge how heuristics influence information security 
processes. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption in internet browsers is an example 
of a visual cue for users that could play a role in simplified decision making. When a 
user notices a padlock in their internet browser they assume it is a secure session. 
This visual input allows an assumption that may be faulty as the padlock only means 
that a session is encrypted. It does not communicate anything about the identity of 
the party the communication is with. 
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Information security awareness needs to predict the impact of heuristics on human 
decision making processes relevant to information security. Potentially, 
compensating for the availability heuristic might mean extra emphasis focusing on 
security incidents considered a real threat that have not occurred preciously to the 
organisation. The availability heuristic suggests that there will be a lower perception 
of risk for incidents which have not occurred at the organisation before. 
 
3.5. Fear 
Fear is an evolutionary survival aid which is governed by the amygdala [SB-08]. The 
amygdala governs the human reaction to fear – it controls the release of hormones in 
the bloodstream to generate the “flight or fight response”. This function may have 
been an evolutionary advantage in the past but in modern times it is a potential 
handicap against risks that we can’t outrun. An increased heart rate and the urge to 
flee is less useful in a modern context when dealing with risks that require a more 
logical, analytical approach. It is unlikely to be of benefit to flee in terror at the 
prospect of a job interview or being asked to give out your credit card number over 
the web, although some of us may be tempted to.  
 
There are two main problems with this fear response in a modern context. Firstly, we 
seem to target our fears in an irrational way, more of which will be explored in the 
next section on the perception of risk. Stephen Pinker, a psychologist with a 
background in Experimental Psychology suggests that some of our current fears are 
the result of evolutionary threats in our recent past: 
  
“Fears in modern city-dwellers protect us from dangers that no longer exist, and fail 
to protect us from dangers in the world around us. We ought to be afraid of guns, 
driving fast, driving without a seatbelt, lighter fluid, and hair dryers near bathtubs, not 
of snakes and spiders…but when Chicago schoolchildren were asked what they 
were most afraid of, they cited lions, tigers, and snakes, unlikely hazards in the windy 
city.” [SP-97] 
 
Secondly, the problem with the inbuilt fear response is that a raised heart rate and 
the urge to flee interfere with cognitive functions: 
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“When someone is emotionally aroused, his or her cognitive functioning changes. In 
times of high arousal (stress), cognitive focus becomes narrow and the individual can 
attend to less at a time…high levels of arousal can lead to mistakes.” [BBJ-04] 
 
Dennis Ford has noted the following stress impact on memory [FD-93] but the 
concept is also applicable to other cognitive functions such as decision making: 
 
 
Diagram to show relationship between memory efficiency and stress [FD-93] 
 
Bock-Brown notes that organisations often appeal to fear in pursuit of information 
security objectives such as “disciplinary measures, litigation threats, retraining, 
naming, blaming and shaming.”  [BBJ-04] 
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As well as creating situations where cognitive function is impaired through excessive 
fear, an appeal to fear approach is also vulnerable to what Kim Witte has termed the 
“Boomerang effect” [BBJ-04]. When an individual is confronted with a risk, it is not 
just the severity of the risk which is evaluated from the perspective of the individual. 
The individual also considers their ability to control or eliminate the threat.  
 
Where the individual perceives that danger and their own ability to manage the 
danger is high, they are likely to take steps to control the risk. However, if the danger 
is high but the individual perceives a low ability to manage the danger, the individual 
is likely to develop a “Cognitive Dissonance”. This is when a contradiction exists 
between two cognitions or thoughts. This could include a contradiction between 
cognitions such as knowledge, attitude or behaviour. Stephen Pinker states that 
cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable state for the individual who will “invent a 
new opinion” [SP-00] to resolve it. This could include an adoption of one of the biases 
listed above.  
 
Jeff Bock-Brown makes an important point that perception of fear and control efficacy 
is an individual property. This means that an organisation wide appeal to fear is 
difficult to pitch at an optimum level where significant motivation is gained for some 
subjects without creating effective risk apathy in others. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
In the absence of empirical benefits for information security, information security 
awareness campaigns use fear to sell a message and act as a motivator rather than 
depending on return on investment calculations. 
 
The language of information security is not neutral. Even before being applied to 
information systems, words such as “Virus” and “Hacker” all have unpleasant, fear 
generating properties which by causing a heightened state of fear arousal, may 
decrease people’s ability to make rational decisions. The language of fear may go 
some way to explain impaired human cognition when dealing with information 
systems.  
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Appealing to fear without addressing the audience’s perceived ability to control the 
risk could produce information security apathy amongst the target audience which is 
a form of inevitability bias [LT-05]. Also, appealing to fear is a form of negative 
reinforcement covered above. Using positive reinforcement may offer improved 
behaviour without the risk of the “Boomerang effect”.  
3.6. Learned Helplessness 
The level of efficacy present in a situation is not only relevant to fear, but is significant 
for other stimulus such as punishments.  
 
Seligman performed a series of experiments [GR-05] on dogs where electric shocks 
were applied. Some of the dogs had the opportunity to avoid the shocks and some 
did not.  
 
The experiment found that the dogs which had been exposed for a period to shocks 
without the possibility to avoid them were significantly slower at avoiding the shocks 
when given the opportunity. It appears that the dogs came to accept the shocks as 
inevitable and were not disposed to learning coping mechanisms when given the 
opportunity.  
 
This experiment was repeated with human participants for a similar conclusion [GR-
05]. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
The theory of Learned Helplessness suggests that providing motivation in the 
absence of efficacy can have significant negative consequences on long term 
behaviour. For example, organisations need to check that the means for compliance 
with information security awareness is present before communication takes place. 
For example, raising awareness about the need to use secure paper disposal without 
providing secure disposal bins will lead to a learned helplessness where information 
system users come to accept non-compliance and any associated sanctions as 
inevitable.  
 
Psychology and Information Security 
 
© Geordie Stewart 2008 Page 49 of 104 
3.7. Risk Perception 
There is a growing area of research which seeks to understand the impact that 
certain attributes have on the perception of risk. Paul Slovic is one of the leading 
academics examining the perception of risk and how it is communicated. An area of 
his research is the adjustment of the severity of risk based on its apparent attributes. 
In the publication “The Perception of Risk”, Slovic has identified a number of factors 
[SP-00] which influence the severity of how we perceive risk: 
 
Observable / Not Observable: people appear to have a greater fear for the invisible 
or intangible. A possible explanation for this is that fear is exaggerated when the 
threat is difficult to quantify and when subjects have no way of identifying when they 
are exposed to the threat. An evolutionary explanation for this is that historically, risks 
have been relatively obvious such fire, rancid meat or a dangerous animal. Modern 
threats have become less apparent and more intangible which may add to the level 
of risk perceived. Modern risks now include dangers such as carcinogens and 
poisonous gasses such as carbon monoxide. If a risk cannot be perceived then the 
individual is not able to take mitigative action which may explain a heightened level of 
fear.  
 
Defined / Ill Defined: when an element of uncertainty is involved people tend to 
exaggerate the risks involved. Christopher Booker and Richard North have charted 
modern scares impacting the British public in their book “Scared to Death”. They note 
that one of the important ingredients required to cause a panic is that the danger 
must be “…Ill defined, maximising the opportunity for alarmist speculation as to the 
damage it might cause.” [BC-07] This property may be partly dependent on the 
observable trait listed above and is consistent with Slovic’s research [SP-00] on risk 
perception. 
 
Old Risk / New Risk: people have a greater fear of novel or new risks. Technology 
has been a significant example in this category. Nuclear power, mobile phones and 
computers. In theory, the risk of giving a credit card over the phone is comparable to 
the risk of giving out a credit card online. However, there is a significant difference in 
perceptions. Surveys have revealed that people are much more reluctant to give out 
their credit card numbers online. This can be attributed in part to the “New” risk 
perception of computers and the internet verses “Old” risks such as the telephone 
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which has been around far longer. Speaking to a human is a tangible interaction 
where as a browser session is an abstract interaction, the mechanics of which are 
probably not well understood by most users. 
 
Familiar / Unfamiliar: the old adage is that familiarity breeds contempt. People are 
more likely to perceive familiar items or concepts as less risky. Statistically, one of 
the most dangerous threats in a home environment are swimming pools, yet guns 
and home invasions are perceived as far more risky [LS-06]. The contradiction to the 
familiarity bias is when an individual has suffered an incident from a familiar item in 
the past which can create an availability bias causing them to overestimate the risk 
based on their prior experience. 
 
Chronic / Acute: chronic conditions are those that build up over time while acute 
conditions are by comparison sudden and the outcome is less predictable. Angus 
McIlwraith notes the apparent contradiction on how we treat the risk from illness: 
 
“The major medical killers are chronic. Acute deaths get the headlines.” [MA-06] 
 
Controlled by Self / Controlled by Others: it appears that the perception of who 
controls a situation changes people’s perceptions of risk:  
 
“Most people are less afraid of a risk they feel they have some control over, like 
driving, and more afraid of a risk they don’t control, like flying, or sitting in the 
passenger seat while somebody else drives.” [SB-08] 
 
Risks which might be caused by the actions of others are somehow seen as worse 
than the same action performed by ourselves. This explains why some people insist 
on driving and refuse to be a passenger, citing concerns about trusting others to 
drive. They would often have no rational basis to claim that their driving was better, 
only that they feel more comfortable (in control) when driving. This may be related to 
a perception bias: 
 
“…most people claim they are above average in any positive trait you name: 
leadership, sophistication, athletic prowess, managerial ability or even driving skill. 
They rationalise the boast by searching for an aspect of the trait that they might in 
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fact be good at. The slow drivers say they are above average in safety, the fast ones 
that they are above average in reflexes.” [PS-98] 
 
Diffuse in Time and Space / Focused in Time and Space: it may be part of a 
survival mechanism that human attention is focused on catastrophic events at a fixed 
point in time. Angus McIlwraith gives a good medical example: 
 
“If all of the 10,000 people who die prematurely each year in the UK from smoking-
related illnesses were to do so at one o’clock in the afternoon on 10 February in 
Parliament Square, the reaction would be very negative, and rapid remedial action 
would follow.” [MA-06] 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
When risks are communicated to people as part of information security awareness it 
is important to recognise that individuals will apply their own filters to their 
perceptions of risk. This will result in risk perceptions being adjusted internally. 
Severity, likelihood and overall risk will all be subject to adjustments unique to the 
individual.  
 
The implications of Slovic’s work [SP-00] is that these adjustments are likely to have 
commonalities which will show degrees of consistency. The more diverse the 
members of the organisation, the more diverse the perceptions of risk will be.  
Organisations need to identify and take these perception biases into account when 
communicating the level of risk for threats.  
 
Risks which are familiar, chronic (building over time) and self controllable will require 
extra effort to communicate over risks that are unfamiliar, acute (sudden) and 
controlled by others. Organisations need to follow up risk communications and check 
that the perceptions of the target audience match the severity of the risk being 
communicated. 
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3.8. Risk Communication 
Risk communication is a key component of an information security awareness 
program. Educating the audience to the risks of non compliance is a key part of the 
message. However, when risk communication fails there is a tendency to blame the 
audience: 
 
“Although citizens may begin their learning process with relatively little technical 
understanding, we believe that most can understand the basic issues needed to 
make informed decisions about many technically based risks – given time, effort, and 
careful explanation. Unfortunately, when a message is not understood, the recipients, 
rather than the message often get blamed for the communications failure.” [MM-02] 
 
This section examines failings of risk communication and examines two possible 
causes: 
 
Firstly, looking outside of information security, Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom and 
Atman [MM-02] suggest that all risk communication needs to be considered in 
context. They suggest that it is not enough to identify relevant risks, optimise the 
presentation and delivery and then allow time for the message to work:  
 
“…for most risks, people have at least some relevant beliefs, which they will use in 
interpreting the communication. They may have heard some things about the risk in 
question. It may remind them of related phenomena. Its very name may evoke some 
associations.” [MM-02] 
 
Slovic has a similar view that existing knowledge is an important factor in risk 
communication: 
 
“Despite good intentions however, it may be quite difficult to create effective 
informational programs. Doing an adequate job means finding cogent ways of 
presenting complex, technical material that is clouded by uncertainty and subject to 
distortion by the listener’s preconceptions – or misconceptions – about the hazard 
and its consequences.” [SP-00] 
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According to Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom and Atman, an important prepatory step to 
risk communication is the construction of a Mental Model to conceptualise the beliefs 
and attitudes of the intended audience. This is done through asking open ended 
questions to explore the perceived relationships of words, their associations and the 
perceived severity and likelihood of associative risks. This provides an opportunity to 
recognise when audiences misunderstand the meaning of words or have incorrect 
associations. The Mental Models are used to create a series of relationships that can 
be quantified to create an accurate picture of linked concepts for the audience.  
 
Once the audience has identified words and concepts related to risks Morgan, 
Fischhoff, Bostrom and Atman recommend the use of mental model questionnaires 
to identify patterns in understanding. These are intended to identify: 
• The strength of beliefs held by the target audience 
• The connection and depth of misconceptions held by the target audience 
• The understanding of critical terms used to describe risk 
 
Misconceptions occur when an audience consistently has a different understanding 
of a key word or term used by technical specialists. A gap in understanding displays 
a concept that needs to be clarified and communicated before effective risk 
communication can proceed. 
 
Secondly, it is important to note that words used to communicate the message are 
unlikely to mean exactly the same things for all parties involved. Morgan, Fischhoff, 
Bostrom and Atman acknowledge that the perceived meaning of the words dictate 
the perception created for the receiver. McIlwraith makes an important point about 
the various terms used for information security jargon. Entire books have been 
written attempting to define such concepts as “Risk”, “Threat” and “Countermeasure”, 
so can we expect non-technical audiences to have the same perception of these 
words as information security professionals? Here, McIlwraith notes the importance 
of translating technical terms into concepts that can be understood accurately by the 
intended audience: 
 
“There is a linguistic concept called a vocabulary domain. This is the distinct set of 
terms used within a specific area of expertise. Lawyers have their own, as do 
doctors…Consider your audience, and empathize with their needs.” [MA-06] 
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“False Fluency” is the term that Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom and Atman have given to 
the misunderstandings that can happen between technical specialists (such as 
information security) and individuals with a limited knowledge of the subject being 
communicated. 
  
Outside of words which exist as a communications utility in a technical discipline, 
ordinary, everyday words can also contribute to misunderstandings and result in 
differences in perception. Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) is a contentious 
concept which is not fully accepted by mainstream psychology [BBJ-04]. One area of 
value to information security communications is NLP’s focus on words as abstract 
concepts which are subject to individual interpretation: 
 
“A map is not the territory it depicts; words are not the things they describe; symbols 
are not the things they represent.” [BA-00] 
 
The NLP view is that all human cognition operates though a set of filters. There are 
no good or bad filters, only the extent to which a filter is effective in representing an 
abstract concept.  
 
“Language is a filter. It is a map of our thoughts and experiences, removed a further 
level from the real world.” [OJ-02] 
 
The more similar the background between two individuals communicating the closer 
their mental maps of what shared words relate to. Finding common meanings for 
words in modern organisations with a diverse set of backgrounds including job roles, 
nationality and culture can be a significant issue. 
 
Another important factor in risk communication is the context in which communication 
takes place. According to Slovic [SP-00] and Morgan et al [MM-02], an audience will 
be influenced by the following factors: 
Authority: Who is communicating the information and what are their 
credentials? 
Trust: Has the communicating party been reliable in the past? 
Efficacy: To what extent is the audience empowered to deal with the risk? 
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Slovic also notes that trust is slow to build but can be quickly destroyed: 
 
“Favourable traits (such as trustworthiness) were judged to be hard to acquire…and 
easy to loose.” [SP-00] 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
It is unlikely that the subject matter to be covered in an information security 
awareness program will be completely new to the audience. The audience is likely to 
have an existing awareness about issues such as identity theft, fraud and industrial 
espionage from previous organisations, news sources or incidents experienced 
personally. Any communications that take place will be affected in some way by their 
existing knowledge. The availability heuristic covered earlier is one way that 
individuals can make their own judgements about the likelihood of risk based on their 
own experiences. The perceived likelihood of a risk occurring will be modified based 
on personal experience.  
 
The meaning of words used in risk communication is another area where information 
security communication could be problematic. Specialist areas develop specialist 
language and the language of information security is a complex area. The implication 
of the NLP approach to learning is that some of the words we use to describe 
security concepts are inherently misleading. The concept “Password” to an 
information security professional is a string of characters offered to an information 
system to confirm a proposed identity. Should there be any surprise when non-
technical system users attempt to use a dictionary word as their password? 
 
Taking into account the need to quantify existing perceptions and the need to 
cultivate a common understanding of language, a process of refinement is required in 
order to optimise communication for human participation in any proposed information 
system. Feedback needs to be gained from a pilot audience in order to gauge the 
impact and accuracy of the content being delivered. Depending on the level of 
importance of the communication, Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom and Atman suggest 
multiple iterations until the communication is reliable. It is also of note that distinct 
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areas within large organisations may need to be evaluated separately in order to 
identify differences that exist between departments or divisions.  
 
To test and demonstrate this process a survey was carried out at a large UK 
transport company. A series of twenty questions were designed to test information 
security beliefs and attitudes. The survey covered the Information Security Team, a 
Human Resources Team and an Accounts Team. Answers could consist of  
• True 
• Probably True 
• Neutral / Unsure 
• Probably False 
• False 
 
The goal was to test the consistency of attitudes and beliefs within the two teams (the 
degree to which views were internally homogenised) and the degree to which the 
teams, even as part of the same organisation, had different attitudes and beliefs. The 
full survey results are available for review in Appendix A. 
 
The results were startling. Even within the teams there were a diverse set of beliefs 
and polarised attitudes.  
 
Firstly, the interpretation of words was shown to be problematic. Question Two tested 
the perception of the words “Threat” and “Risk” with the statement: “A risk is the 
same thing as a threat”. Even within the Information Security Team there was a 
significant divergence, indicating that there were different beliefs about the meaning 
of the concept of “Threat” and “Risk”. This is surprising given that the Information 
Security Team were the technical specialists in this language domain. 
 
Within the Human Resources Team there was also a divergent range of perceptions 
about threats and risks. Faced with uncertainty in a subject matter outside of their 
expertise, most of the HR responses might have been expected to be “Neutral” or 
“Probably False” or “Probably True”. Instead, 37% of responses professed to be sure 
that the answer was either “True” or “False”. The debate about which answer was 
“correct” for each question is less important than the fact that many answers had 
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polarised responses. This result may be partially explained by the concept of “False 
Fluency” identified by Morgan [MM-02] discussed above. 
 
The clear implication from this study is that defining key terms such as “Threat” or 
“Risk” needs to take place before any communications commence. An awareness 
campaign communicating ways to control or reduce risk is unlikely to be effective if 
the target audience fundamentally misunderstands the concept of what a risk is. Part 
of the initial communication might be to define exactly what the organisation defines 
a “threat” to be. 
 
Question 17 of the survey tested an attitude: “Taking computer files home to work on 
a home computer is a security breach”. The results were split down the middle for the 
Information Security Team. Half the team said that it was a security breach and half 
the team said it wasn’t. While it could be argued that this reflects a healthy range of 
opinions, it also represents the possibility for mixed communications causing 
confusion within an audience. The Human Resources Team also showed a 
significant divergence in attitudes to taking work home.  
 
Acknowledging the existing awareness and possible misconceptions appears to be a 
concept missing from the majority of information security publications surveyed. It is 
not enough for information security policy and awareness to be factually correct. It 
must also “…reinforce pertinent correct beliefs and discourage important incorrect 
ones.” [MM-02] 
 
It is clear that the context must first be quantified for all risk communication activities. 
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3.9. Attitudes 
A review of Psychology publications [GR-05], [EM-05] has found that there have 
been significant disagreements over the definition of an attitude. This seems to stem 
from the problem that the concept of an attitude is a construct and can’t be measured 
directly. Allport (1935) saw attitudes as part of a social context and Festinger (1950) 
also perceived an important interdependence between the individual and a group. 
More recent research has focused on attitudes as predispositions for an internal 
process. Rosenberg and Hovland (1960) defined three classes of response: 
• Affective: an emotional response to stimulus involving a favourable or 
unfavourable perception for example the feeling of fear when confronted with 
a snake 
• Cognitive: the analysis of a stimulus for example describing a snake as slimy 
and dangerous 
• Behavioural: this is the visible response to a stimulus for example the action 
of running away from a snake 
 
While attitudes are a predictor of behaviour, the level of prediction has been criticised 
as weak. Makin and Cox [MP-04] note the experiment done by LaPiere in the 1930’s: 
 
“Over a two year period LaPiere, together with a young Chinese couple, stayed in 66 
hotels and other forms of accommodation, and ate in 184 restaurants in the USA. At 
that time there was considerable prejudice against the Chinese, yet on only one 
occasion were they refused service. Following his experiences, LaPiere sent a 
questionnaire to all the places they had visited, asking if they were prepared to serve 
Chinese people. Of the 50 per cent who responded approximately 90 per cent said 
they would not. This demonstration of an apparent mismatch between attitudes and 
behaviour has troubled social psychologists ever since.” [MP-04] 
 
This experiment clearly shows the difference between opinions gathered as part of a 
survey and the actual behaviour of the participants.  
 
LaPiere’s study led to a focus on “Situational Factors” which influence the degree to 
which an attitude is perceived as applicable by the individual. Gross [GR-05] notes 
that the Chinese couple in LaPiere’s study were well dressed and may not have 
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accurately fulfilled the stereotype of Chinese people at the time. Therefore, if the 
Chinese couple did not fit the stereotype then the associated attitude may not have 
been evoked. 
 
How attitudes change is a significant area of research in Social Psychology.  
 
According to the theory of Cognitive Dissonance [GR-05] tension is produced when 
an individual simultaneously holds two cognitions which are inconsistent. This 
provides the motivation for change. Festinger (1957) noted that instead of behaviour 
changing to reflect a new attitude, the attitude is more likely to change to rationalise 
the behaviour. For example, when smokers are presented with evidence of smoking 
related diseases, it is more likely that attitudes will change to rationalise the 
behaviour. Smokers might “Belittle the evidence about smoking and cancer”. [GR-05] 
 
An important study by Freedman in 1965 found that the theory of cognitive 
dissonance only applies when the individual perceives the behaviour as voluntary. 
The perception of limited choice reduces the potential conflict between behaviour and 
attitudes. One of the famous studies demonstrating this effect was Milgram’s 
obedience experiment where participants continued applying electric shocks to 
apparently unconscious participants. The apparent attitude of revulsion for hurting 
other people was overridden by the authority of the experiment supervisor. [GR-05] 
 
Self Perception Theory [GR-05] was a concept from Bem which attempted to 
rationalise attitudes in a behavioural context. Bem thought that attitudes were 
inferred by the individual from observing their own behaviour and the situation in 
which it occurs. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
This section has provided powerful evidence for why information security awareness 
surveys will provide a weak indicator of effectiveness for information security 
awareness. In Chapter Two it was shown that information security awareness 
requires a behavioural change to be effective.  
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3.10. Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture is an acceptance of common attitudes and beliefs at a 
collective level. An understanding of organisational culture is important in any attempt 
to understand or influence internal patterns of behaviour. There is a significant 
ongoing debate about what organisational culture is and how it evolves. Most 
attempts to quantify organisational culture measure the impact of culture, not culture 
itself.  
 
Edgar Schein defines organisational culture as an ongoing process: 
 
“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.” [SE-04] 
 
Schein has described three examples of culture: 
 
1. Artefacts are visible embodiments of culture expressed by a group. They can 
include dress codes and published values. While artefacts are the most visible 
examples of culture, they are also the most difficult to interpret. An observer 
can easily perceive the artefact as an example of culture but its meaning may 
not be clear. 
2. Beliefs and values are solutions to group problems which have been 
perceived to have been successfully proven at some point in the group’s 
history. Beliefs and values help interpret the artefacts present in organisations. 
3. Underlying assumptions are the deeper shared perspectives of a group and 
the most resistant to change. To change an underlying assumption it must be 
challenged.  
 
In contrast, Reason [BBJ-04] defines organisational culture in terms of an outcome: 
 
“Shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with an 
organisation’s structures and control systems to produce behavioural norms (the way 
we do things round here).” [BBJ-04] 
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Though described from different perspectives, both views of organisational culture 
are consistent in that the effect is a form of behavioural control stemming from social 
norms.  
 
Publications on organisational culture discuss theories on the mechanisms driving 
organisational culture changes. An early influence was the work of Douglas 
McGregor in The Human Side of Enterprise [CE-04]. He proposed that there were at 
least two management theories of workforce motivation and control. Theory X was a 
pessimistic view which held that people were lazy, needed to be told what to do and 
lacked ingenuity. Theory Y held that people were basically cooperative, capable of 
commitment to the organisation’s objectives and would accept responsibility given 
the right environment. McGregor suggested that managers operating using 
assumptions matching theory X were less successful than theory Y. 
 
Force Field Analysis was a concept developed by Kurt Lewin to conceptualise group 
dynamics [HM-08]. The idea is based on the proposition that in all organisations 
there are driving and restraining forces which work in opposite directions. The field in 
the middle represents equilibrium: 
 
Force Field Diagram 
 
Force field diagram © Geordie Stewart 
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By conceptualising organisational forces it makes it possible to identify and measure 
the strength of the forces involved. The equilibrium can be shifted by either 
weakening a restraining force or strengthening a driving force. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
McGregor’s findings indicate that audiences for information security awareness 
communications will respond better if given the opportunity to cooperate and accept 
responsibility willingly. Information security awareness could fit either a Theory X 
profile or a Theory Y profile depending on how it is implemented.  
 
McIlwraith recommends that where possible, information security communications 
should avoid making demands, issuing deadlines and fostering a blame culture [MA-
06]. Instead, organisations should encourage good information security practices with 
rewards and recognition.  
 
Hogervorst has applied Lewin’s Force Field concept to information security culture 
[HM-08] and has found an innovative way to identify and measure the forces involved 
when promoting information security awareness. She has also attempted to apply 
this concept to making a business case for information security awareness and in this 
effort she has been less successful. For example, when Lewin’s model is used in this 
way it is not clear what the equilibrium represents. Hogervorst lists “Limited Budget” 
as a restraining force. If the equilibrium is to represent an appropriate balance 
between cost and control expenditure then it is not clear how changing factors such 
as the available budget will make an organisation “more secure”. Arguably, the point 
at which the organisation would be considered secure should be determined by a risk 
assessment and costing of control options [SB-06]. 
 
3.11. Risk Compensation 
Risk compensation, sometimes called Risk Homeostasis, occurs when a subject 
increases risk taking behaviour in response to a decrease in risk. When a risk 
equilibrium changes in a positive way, there is a tendency for individuals to change 
their behaviour in a way that nullifies some or all of the original risk reduction. Dr Ian 
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Walker measured the distance allowed by motorists when passing a cyclist and 
found a significant difference based on the cyclist wearing a helmet or not: 
 
 “Dr Walker, a traffic psychologist from the University's Department of Psychology, 
said: This study shows that when drivers overtake a cyclist, the margin for error they 
leave is affected by the cyclist's appearance.” [BBC-A] 
 
By passing closer to cyclists, motorists were increasing the likelihood of an accident. 
This may have been rationalised by motorists considering a cyclist wearing a helmet 
is better protected in the event of an accident (a perceived reduction in the severity of 
impact). 
 
The original proponent of Risk Homeostasis, Gerald J.S. Wilde, has argued that 
attitudes need to change in order to ascribe to a higher level of safety (or security) for 
the individuals involved and that most safety campaigns tend to “move risk around”. 
Implicitly this suggests that people come to accept the current level of risk in their 
particular environment and find ways to rationalise continuing at the same level of 
risk even when environmental factors change offering a potential overall reduction. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
It is important that any change in an information security risk equation in which a 
threat is reduced identifies the expectations of the individuals involved. This is 
necessary to raise the expectation of what an appropriate level of risk should be. 
Otherwise, with the introduction of a new information security control, individuals may 
increase risk taking which may impact the net benefit of the original control being 
applied.  
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3.12. Groupthink 
Groupthink occurs when group decision making processes result in excessive risk 
taking [BBJ-04]. It can be recognised by the following characteristics: 
 
1. Collectively, groups accept a higher tolerance for risk than an individual 
making the same decision. This appears to be related to a diffusion of 
responsibility for the decision when no individual member of the group is to be 
held accountable for the outcome 
2. Dismissing warnings which are contrary to the group's assumptions 
3. Belief that the morality of the group is absolute. This may be related to number 
one above 
4. Stereotyping opposition to the group as dishonest or incapable in some way 
5. Collective ridicule or censorship of any dissent from within the group 
6. Voluntary self censorship from individuals within the group of ideas contrary to 
the group consensus 
7. A false perception of consensus emerges because individuals self-sensor and 
external dissent has been rationalised as unimportant 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
To avoid the pattern of groupthink it is important that information security awareness 
focuses on personal accountability. Personal accountability is an essential 
component to motivate individuals to recognise what behaviour is required from 
them. 
 
This has two important implications for information security awareness. Firstly, the 
design and implementation of awareness as a risk control can be developed by 
committee but should be approved by a responsible individual.  
 
Secondly, the audience of information security awareness needs to be addressed as 
individuals. Organisational culture might help foster a sense of expectation for group 
behaviour which can provide social motivations, but the implications of groupthink 
accentuate the need to identify specific actions required by specific individuals in the 
context of information security. 
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3.13. Internalisation 
Timothy Layton criticises the current approach which expects that the audience of 
information security awareness will successfully translate knowledge of the 
organisation’s requirements into the desired behavioural outcome: 
 
“The traditional approach to information security and information security awareness 
is for most organizations descriptive in nature. In practical terms, many organisations 
take the approach of “informing” their user community of their security practices, 
guidelines and procedures. This would be described as a descriptive approach, 
meaning users are told they must comply because management requires them to. 
The descriptive-based approach does nothing to help the users internalize or justify 
the organizations requirements, therefore their attitudes and motivations will be 
lacking and ultimately produce undesirable results.” [LT-05] 
 
Layton makes a strong case for the importance of internalisation which results from 
prescriptive communications. Prescriptive communications are defined by Layton as 
internalised, rationalised decision making processes that incorporate knowledge and 
attitude to leverage behaviour. One of the ways to convey a prescriptive 
communication is to reference morals and ethics: 
 
 “The bottom line is that most people do not generally accept something just because 
a superior publishes a requirement, making the descriptive-based approach a poor 
investment. The majority of people will only internalise and support the message if 
they have justified it, believe in it, and think it is reasonable. It is logical to conclude 
the importance of measuring and understanding user’s internalization of 
organizational policies.” [LT-05] 
 
Layton advises an accomplishment based approach which acknowledges three 
developmental stages – preparation, awareness and commitment. Broadly, he 
suggests treating information security as an attitude rather than a technology issue. 
The starting point is to explain to the target audience why they should care about an 
issue. This is the prerequisite for developing an attitude where the consequence of 
compliance can be valued: “People need to understand why and how, not just told to 
comply with a policy.” [LT-05] 
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3.14. Chapter Summary 
Areas of learning from the Psychology discipline relevant to information security 
awareness were identified and presented in an information security context. 
Motivations for compliance were analysed and evaluated in light of their application in 
an organisation with a view to their possible effectiveness.  
 
It seems that compliance in an information security context usually depends on a fear 
motivator, and this may only apply when an individual perceives there is strong 
likelihood of being caught or the punishments are severe. Also, the need for real time 
monitoring was discussed and the possibility of increased motivation for compliance 
resulting from immediate feedback rather than compliance checks on a less real time 
basis such as monthly. 
 
Areas of risk perception, cognition and bias were discussed. Humans appear to be 
broadly logical creatures but some systematic failures have been identified. 
Heuristics are mental shortcuts that are a consequence of the need to make 
decisions in a short period of time. While these mental shortcuts can lead to bias and 
behaviour which appears illogical, this behaviour is also predictable. Information 
security professionals need to anticipate the cognitive biases present in their 
audiences and adjust their information security awareness messages accordingly.  
 
The concept of risk perception is exposed as a uniquely personal interpretation that 
organisations need to consider before embarking on a communications exercise.  
 
In the next chapter, the concept of tuning a message for an audience is explored in a 
Marketing context.
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4. Marketing and Information Security 
 
At the start of this thesis it was observed that the discipline of Marketing may have a 
correlation with the objectives of information security awareness because of the 
Marketing focus on influencing the behaviour of a given audience. This chapter 
explains what Marketing is and identifies Marketing principles which might be 
valuable to information security professionals. 
 
A review of Marketing publications [SA-01] [BP-08] [GP-07] has shown that there are 
numerous objectives of Marketing and a variety of ways which organisations choose 
to implement Marketing. Baines, Fill and Page [BP-08] identify three main definitions: 
 
1. A Chartered Institute of Marketing (CIM) definition: “The management 
process of anticipating, identifying and satisfying customer requirements 
profitably.” [BP-08] 
2. An American Marketing Association (AMA) definition: “…the activity, set of 
instructions, and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and 
exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and 
society at large.” [BP-08] 
3. A French perspective: “…the endeavor of adapting organizations to their 
competitive markets in order to influence, in their favor, the behavior of their 
publics, with an offer whose perceived value is durably superior to that of the 
competition” (Lendrevie, Levy and Lindon 2006). [BP-08] 
 
There are two common themes to these definitions. The first is the communications 
component and the second is the notion of profit or value. A form of dialogue takes 
place which enables a mutually beneficial result. In the previous section on 
Psychology it was noted that attitudes were an important component in the process 
of rationalising behaviour. Could Marketing help with the problem of understanding 
and changing attitudes for the benefit of information security awareness? 
 
“Since marketing is about understanding customers’ needs, we must place ourselves 
in the mindset of our customer if we are able to properly understand their needs.” 
[BP-08]
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While Psychology relies on studies where often people recognise that they are being 
measured in some way, marketers have the advantage that sales patterns exist with 
millions of participants, none of whom need be conscious of being studied.  
 
It is important here to note the difference between “Sales” and “Marketing”. Baines, 
Fill and Page identify an important distinction: 
 
“…sales emphasizes the process of product push, by creating distribution incentives 
for both salespeople and customers to make exchanges which may or may not 
benefit the customer in the long term.” [BP-08] 
 
From this definition, the sales process is the last step in a delivery cycle of a product 
or service. This is in contrast to Marketing’s longer term focus: 
 
“Marketing on the other hand is more focused on creating product pull, or demand, 
amongst customers and consumers, and the offering is designed and redesigned 
through customer and consumer input, through research to meet their longer-term 
needs”. [BP-08] 
 
Some aspects of Marketing are less relevant to information security awareness. 
Implicit in the definition of a customer or a consumer is that normally money is 
exchanged and money acts as the long term motivation for the party performing the 
Marketing. However, profit is not always the motivation for Marketing: 
 
“…there is a vast swathe of other organizations that operate in what is referred to as 
the non-profit sector. For example, local government, churches, museums, charities, 
universities, zoos and public hospitals all operate without profit as their central 
goal…Non-profit organizations have a range of goals, a multiple set of tasks they 
seek to achieve. These include generating awareness…” [BP-08] 
 
The closest correlation to information security awareness would probably be 
government campaigns such as “Think” Road Safety”, an initiative that seeks to 
influence the behaviour of people for the benefit of road safety. The Department for 
Transport’s stated objective is: 
Marketing and Information Security 
 
© Geordie Stewart 2008 Page 69 of 104 
“To reduce the number of people killed or seriously injured in road accidents by 40 
per cent by 2010...” [DFT-A] 
 
This campaign has some key similarities to information security awareness: 
• Profit is not the primary objective. (Although there may be a significant shared 
economic benefit from reducing road accidents) 
• Awareness of risk is one of the key components which the campaign seeks to 
communicate 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
There are important points to note for information security professionals from the 
various definitions of Marketing. The CIM definition mentions “anticipating” 
requirements. To what extent should information security awareness be predictive? 
How often are information security awareness initiatives only generated as a 
response to a security incident? 
 
“A frequently noticed behaviour is that companies start to think about security only 
after having their first incidents, and stop their actions a short time later. It is essential 
to develop new approaches to make sure that companies are able to handle security 
as a process…” [SJ-08] 
 
The Marketing approach reinforces a focus on long term anticipation of needs rather 
than incident response. 
 
The AMA definition above mentions communicating information that has “value” for 
the target audience. “Value” in the context of information security awareness is more 
difficult to define. In theory, a user of an information system within an organisation 
has a vested interest in protecting the information system. The problem here is that 
when an organisation suffers an information security breach caused by an individual, 
the individual is unlikely to suffer as much as the organisation, especially if the cause 
of the breach is never attributed. If the user is an employee and their behaviour 
results in damage to the information system the employee could face disciplinary 
action or other social sanctions within the organisation. Or, the cause of the security 
breach may never be identified. For companies or other profit motivated 
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organisations, serious damage to an information system could conceivably impact 
the organisation’s financial viability. If the company’s viability is threatened this could 
result in job losses or company failure. Job security should be one of the motivators 
for employees within profit generating organisations. Even if the cause of a security 
incident could not be attributed to an individual, the motivation of employment 
security could still apply. 
 
Having reviewed the current theories of Marketing in an information security context, 
the following definition for information security Marketing is proposed: 
 
“Anticipating the communication requirements of an audience to develop behaviour 
of a mutual, measured benefit which results in a reduction of an organisation’s 
information security risk.” 
 
Using this definition, this chapter will cover relevant Marketing topics such as: 
• Mass Marketing: the use of one way broadcast media 
• Direct Marketing: the use of profile based Marketing to generate a 
measurable response 
• Market Research: the process of identifying needs and communication 
requirements of an audience 
• Diffusion Theory: the adoption profile that results from Marketing activity 
• Social Learning: behavioural change through the imitation of others 
 
4.1. Mass Marketing 
The Mass Marketing approach uses mass mediums [BP-08] such as television and 
radio to reach large audiences. Mass Marketing is frequently used to create, maintain 
or change brand awareness. The value of this approach has been questioned by 
Baines et al [BP-08] for the weak association between receipt of advertising 
messages and actual behaviour. Potentially, Mass Marketing is becoming more 
inefficient as mass markets become smaller and more fragmented. 
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Implications for information security awareness:  
 
Many of the tools used for information security awareness such as posters and 
screen savers would likely be recognised by marketers as a Mass Marketing 
approach. This method anticipates low response rates and it can be difficult to 
quantify the results.  
 
While marketers potentially don’t care who buys their product or service, this is not 
the same for information security awareness. Some “sales” are worth more than 
others. Some members of the audience are more important than others because of 
the tasks they perform. Those who handle sensitive personal data are more 
important to communicate successfully to than those who don’t. Therefore, the Mass 
Marketing approach is a poor method of communicating security awareness. A 
possible exception to this is if the Mass Marketing approach was being performed as 
a part of creating a security culture.  
 
4.2. Direct Marketing 
Direct Marketing is a relatively new phenomenon and is a response to the gradual 
inefficiency of Mass Marketing: 
 
“In the half century leading up to 2005, the whole focus of marketing had been on 
optimizing mass markets…Marketers learned to analyze response rates down to a 
thousandth of a percentage point and to tailor campaigns that would appear to 
maybe 3 percent of an audience of millions…The waste was incredible, but there 
was no alternative in a market that had no way to efficiently speak to communities of 
customers.” [GP-07] 
 
Sargeant and West [SA-01] state that Direct Marketing in contrast to Mass Marketing, 
has an increased focus on the individual. In the later half of the twentieth century, 
markets became increasingly segmented with greater focus on the needs of 
individuals: 
 
“It was 1970 when Alvin Toffler introduced the term demassification into marketing 
vocabulary, noting that mass markets were gradually eroding and with them went the 
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need for mass marketing approaches. By the mid 1970’s consumers had started to 
become more discerning, thoughtful and individualist…For evidence of this new 
thinking it is worth remembering that it is not so very long ago that bathtubs were 
white, telephones were black and cheques were green.” [SA-01] 
 
When dealing with individuals instead of markets, each individual may have a 
preference for communication methods. The degree to which personal interests are 
shared can also vary. Modern databases have facilitated Direct Marketing techniques 
by allowing a large amount of information to be stored about an individual’s 
preferences (previous behaviour) and attributes (characteristics which help define the 
person in some way). While it can take more effort to undertake a Direct Marketing 
approach over a Mass Marketing approach, the response rates from Direct Marketing 
are normally higher. Direct Marketing also supports the overall goal of building a 
relationship with individuals: 
 
“In direct marketing, the goal is to use customer information to develop an ongoing, 
continuous relationship with each individual on the database.” [SA-01] 
 
Ideally Direct Marketing communications are personalised in a way recognisable to 
the audience. Rather than being a blanket communication through a broadcast 
medium such as radio or television, it is usually customised in some way for a 
particular segment of audience. 
 
The other defining feature of Direct Marketing is the expected result – a call to action 
of some sort on behalf of the recipient. Rather than dealing with concepts as abstract 
as brand awareness, Direct Marketing has an empirical outcome expected of each 
set of interactions. The outcome could be to call a phone number, visit a web site or 
reply to a letter. Attributing the responses received allows a return on investment 
(ROI) to be calculated.  
 
It is also important that medium used allows the attribution of responses to the 
invitation that preceded it. For example, phone numbers advertised on a letter as part 
of a Direct Marketing campaign could be unique to the offer. If the phone number is 
not advertised anywhere else the organisation will know exactly how many 
responses the letter generated. Exact measurement of responses is critical to 
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calculating further refinements to the campaign. This is in contrast to Mass 
Marketing: 
 
“With mass marketing it is all but impossible to link a sale to the advertisement that 
initiated it.” [SA-01] 
 
So the defining features of Direct Marketing are that communications are personal in 
some way, take place within the context of an ongoing expected relationship, and 
have a tangible outcome which is measured in order to optimise the process. 
 
The tangible, direct outcome allows a greater degree of ongoing refinement and 
improvement over Mass Marketing approaches. Direct Marketing allows for variations 
to be made in language, content and presentation to separate audiences and the 
results used to optimise future communications. For example, three variations on an 
offer could be sent to a demographic such as 30-50 year old women who have 
previously purchased a book on cooking. The letters could be different in a variety of 
ways: design, font size, use of colour or the size and shape of the envelope. 
Whatever the results, the organisation will have learned how to further optimise their 
communications with that type of customer for that product.  
 
The Direct Marketing approach can also be used to optimise other communication 
factors such as time of year and length of content [SA-01]. 
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
The implication for information security awareness is that most organisations should 
already have the basic prerequisites to communicate information security policy 
based on a Direct Marketing campaign. Consider that there is usually already a 
relationship between the organisation and its target audience who could exist as 
employees or customers of its information system. Secondly most organisations 
would already have a significant database about their potential audience which would 
show many preferences and attributes useful for designing communications. For 
employees the company is likely to have details such as job title, how old they are, 
sex, where they live, what business area they work in, how long they have been 
working for the company and how many times they have called IT for support. For 
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customers of an organisation the organisation will likely know where they live, how 
long they have been a customer and how often they have called for support of an 
information system. These are all useful attributes to know when attempting to 
understand the perspectives and likely responses of an audience.   
 
Another implication of a Direct Marketing approach is the importance of a quantifiable 
result in the form of ROI. To leverage the advantages of Direct Marketing, any 
information security awareness initiative must be measurable in some way. Some 
initiatives may be easier to measure than others.  
 
If information security awareness really is as important as so many information 
security practitioners make it out to be, then is it not worth doing effectively? Taking a 
Direct Marketing approach to information security awareness could hold the answer 
to the problem of attaining and demonstrating effective communication.  
 
4.3. Market Research 
Baines, Fill and Page define Market Research as: 
 
“The design, collection, analysis, and interpretation of data collected for the purpose 
of aiding marketing decision making”. [BP-08] 
 
In this context, Market Research supports the creation of Marketing communications 
by defining subgroups within an audience and identifying ways in which 
communication with these groups might be successful.  
 
Baines, Fill and Page [BP-08] identify two main methods of market segmentation, or 
defining subgroups within an audience: 
1. The Breakdown Method: this is where a market (or audience) is assumed to 
be basically the same and the focus is on identifying differences. 
2. The Build-up Method: this is where a market (or audience) is assumed to be 
different and the focus is on identifying similarities.  
 
According to Baines, Fill and Page the Breakdown Method is most commonly used.  
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Implications for information security awareness:  
 
Improving knowledge about individuals within the target audience offers a way to 
optimise communication. Direct Marketers would be unlikely to send a blanket 
communication to all their customers because of a poor return, so why would an 
organisation adopt a one size fits all approach to information security awareness? 
Does it make sense for all employees to be presented with the same information 
security policy, attend the same information security awareness training and be 
presented with the same motivators for compliance?  
 
In theory, the larger the organisation, the more diverse the communication needs of 
the audience. The needs of office based staff will be different to field engineers. Men 
respond to communications differently than women. Age is another potential factor 
which might hold a clue to the individual’s competency level with computers in 
general. 
 
One of the important aspects to learn from Direct Marketing is relevancy. An 
information security policy might hold any number of chapters or sections relevant for 
different functions within the organisation. Does it make sense to give all policy 
instructions to all users of an information system? The Direct Marketing approach 
would suggest that at the very least, a role based approach should be taken to 
information security policy. For example, an information security policy laid out 
according to ISO 27001 headings might make sense for an information security 
professional, but is unfamiliar for its intended audience. Ideally, a role based 
approach to information security policy might look like the following: 
 
 Chapter One: General User Security Responsibilities 
 Chapter Two: Responsibilities for Managers 
 Chapter Three: Responsibilities for Internet and Email Users 
 Chapter Four: Responsibilities for System Administrators 
 Chapter Five: Responsibilities for System Developers 
 
For example, a manager of system administrators who has access to the internet 
might receive only chapters one, two, three and four. 
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4.4. Social Media 
Traditionally, advertising is a one way transmission with little in the way of 
measurable response from the target audience [BP-08]. While Direct Marketing 
expects a response this is normally an acceptance of an offer or expression of 
preferences. Direct Marketing normally is not considered a full “conversation”. 
 
In contrast to this, Gillin [GP-07] defines Social Media as including a range of two 
way conversations. Typical examples are web blogs and internet forums. Common 
features are that they are decentralised and have feedback channels. The feedback 
channels are the components which tend to make the interaction feel more like a one 
on one conversation. Gillin [GP-07] makes a strong case that the traditional one way 
dynamic has changed with the introduction of Social Media: 
 
“Social media offers marketers a chance to break this gridlock and engage with their 
customers in a whole new way. The new discipline is coming to be known as 
“conversation marketing”. [GP-07] 
 
People are exposed to a large number of advertisements every day, some of it 
contradictory and the expected impact on any individual member of an audience is 
low. Pinker [SP-97] argues that the greater the cognition focused on a 
communication, the more it is expected impact attitudes and beliefs. The majority of 
advertisements such as billboards at the bus stop and messages on mouse mats 
require little in the way of cognitive function, therefore little can be expected in the 
way of impact to audience attitudes and beliefs because specific cognitive focus is 
not required by the situation. Advertising in the traditional sense is limited in its 
cognitive engagement. Often successful advertising uses emotional engagement to 
increase the audience cognition level [BP-08]. This means we feel something in 
response to the message, be it envy, desire or revulsion. 
 
In contrast, an interactive conversation requiring cognitive thought to construct an 
argument or communicate an attitude or belief has a far greater chance to contribute 
to attitudes or beliefs. 
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From a learning perspective, the two way communication of Social Media is similar to 
the “Socratic Method” where an audience participates in a debate about the concepts 
being discussed. The Socratic Method is effective partly because of the increased 
cognitive participation of the audience.  
 
Implications for information security awareness:  
 
Social Media offers two enticing potential benefits to compliance communications 
such as information security awareness.  
 
Firstly, attitudes are more likely to change as a result of a personal conversation than 
a broadcast [SA-01]. A good example illustrating the importance of audience 
feedback is the controversy over security communications for the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA). In this case the TSA published an account of an event 
that occurred at a security checkpoint [TSA-A]. This account came in to widespread 
criticism for its tone and logic by bloggers [SB-A], [GIZ-A]. Chapter Three of this 
thesis identified credibility as one of the key ingredients of influence between a 
subject matter expert and an audience. The security position taken by the TSA 
resulted in ridicule which exposed the TSA’s credibility to damage. Unusually, the 
TSA took the step of replying to the criticism and posted an amended article on its 
website:  
 
“…We obviously had a lapse of judgement on this story and you folks in the 
blogosphere have done a good job of keeping us honest. The points made by 
Gizmodo, Boing Boing, and Bruce Schneier were compelling. First, the headline is 
misleading, we totally over-hyped it…” [TSA-A] 
 
This admission by the TSA is significant. Firstly, the TSA has responded to informal, 
online criticism which is an unusual precedent and demonstrates the power and 
influence of new Social Media. Secondly, it demonstrates the value that TSA places 
in maintaining the perception of credibility. The three internet resources named have 
a significant readership which have been actively participating in criticisms of the 
TSA. Bruce Schneier’s blog alone has 125,000 subscribers [SB-B].  
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Secondly, Social Media can be a useful channel for feedback to discover potential 
security barriers to compliance. As discussed in Chapter Three, barriers to 
compliance can include issues of trust between the subject matter experts and an 
audience which can be very damaging. It is very important that barriers to 
compliance are identified and removed wherever possible.  
 
McIlwraith cites a concern [MA-06] about the use of open media in an information 
security context that consistency of message could be lost and that the moderation of 
a Social Media forum could be resource intensive.  
 
While it is to be expected that different opinions will expressed in a social networking 
environment, these differing opinions can foster a healthy debate about the purpose 
and method of information security in the organisation. Rather than the audience 
receiving a homogenised version, it may stimulate cognitive involvement by exposure 
to alternate points of view. This cognitive involvement is what has been identified in 
Chapter Three as more likely to lead to behavioural change. 
 
Also, if objections to information security activities are raised this gives the 
Information Security Team an opportunity to justify methods and build trust which 
was identified as an important component in Chapter Three.  
 
McIlwraith’s point about moderation of environments being resource intensive is also 
only partially valid. If the resources required to moderate such an environment 
increase this could be because the environment has become more popular and 
therefore more effective. Such an environment also offers the opportunity to collect 
reliable metrics. 
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4.5. Chapter Summary 
Chapter Four investigated the implications for a Marketing approach to information 
security awareness. The importance of identifying differences in perceptions for the 
target market was shown to be a critical success factor in Marketing campaigns. 
 
The Direct Marketing approach was shown to be most similar to the situation faced 
by organisations when dealing with known entities such as staff or customers. Direct 
Marketing stresses an ongoing communications relationship with feedback channels 
and empirical methods to measure success. This approach would be invaluable to 
information security practitioners designing and implementing an information security 
awareness programme.  
 
Market Research showed the importance of identifying the needs of subgroups within 
a target audience. Communications need to be refined on an ongoing basis through 
content, presentation and the frequency of delivery. Consider the model proposed in 
Section 2.4 – the composition of every layer has the potential to either include or 
alienate an individual’s opportunity to learn, motivate or adapt behaviour.  
 
Social Media is discussed as a significant area of opportunity for information security 
professionals to engage more effectively with audiences and build trust.
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The following model has been constructed to summarise the similarities between 
Marketing and information security: 
 
 
Marketing and Information Security Comparison © Geordie Stewart 
 
Chapter Five goes on to summarise the principles identified from Psychology and 
Marketing into a reference model that can be used by information security 
professionals to review the expected effectiveness of an information security 
awareness campaign. 
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5. Proposed Qualitative Model for Measuring Security 
Awareness Effectiveness 
 
It is clear from the review of Psychology and Marketing that there are a complex 
series of factors that impact the success of an information security awareness 
programme.  
 
The following reference model has been created to show designers and 
implementers of information security awareness programmes how to align with 
Psychology and Marketing principles. This includes principles such as risk 
perception, learning and motivation for the modification of behaviour. 
 
Some elements are relevant to the design of an information security awareness 
programme and some are relevant to how it is implemented. 
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Proposed Model #2 - Qualitative Information Security Awareness Scorecard 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative information security awareness scorecard for Psychology and Marketing © Geordie 
Stewart
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6. Conclusions: Psychology and Marketing Implications for 
Information Security Awareness 
 
This thesis has focused on information security awareness and the extent to which 
Psychology and Marketing could help effectiveness and efficiency of information 
security communications. It is clear from the review of Psychology and Marketing 
principles that there is a wealth of knowledge outside of the information technology 
domain which is of benefit to information security practitioners.  
 
Finding One: A Lack of Empirical Metrics 
 
A reoccurring theme in the review of information security awareness effectiveness is 
a lack of metrics to demonstrate the impact of information security awareness. 
Information security practitioners need to find ways of measuring results in the form 
of behaviours. Measuring attitudes and beliefs through the use of surveys is found to 
have a poor correlation with expected behaviour.  
 
This lack of metrics not only causes problems with obtaining business support for 
information awareness activities, but also has contributed to a difficulty in improving 
information security awareness techniques. The bedrock of the Plan, Do, Check, Act 
management cycle is reliable metrics. If there are no reliable ways available to an 
organisation to demonstrate the effectiveness of a particular technique, how can 
improvements be made by identifying that one technique was more effective than 
another? Although this thesis has found ways of improving information security 
awareness using Psychology and Marketing principles, the benefits will be difficult to 
realise because of the lack of metrics. 
 
Information security professionals are to blame for this situation but information 
security professionals are also part of the solution. Information security professionals 
need to move beyond glib statements about the criticality of awareness and focus on 
making a business case for awareness activities. All behaviour has a consequence 
and some consequences are easier to measure than others. Information security 
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professionals need to find ways of measuring these consequences to infer the 
effectiveness of communication techniques.  
 
The model developed in Chapter Two illustrates the steps involved in achieving a 
change in behaviour resulting from risk communication. Each stage in the model 
represents an opportunity for declining effectiveness and therefore metrics are 
needed for each stage in order to identify problems with effectiveness or barriers to 
compliance.  
 
Finding Two: The Importance of Psychology and Marketing 
 
In the disciplines of Psychology and Marketing there are many principles which have 
been identified as relevant to information security communications. These principles 
have been summarised in a “Qualitative Information Security Awareness Scorecard” 
in Chapter Five to enable information security professionals to judge the extent to 
which their approach to information security awareness reflects optimal use of 
Psychology and Marketing. 
 
Direct Marketing is identified as a discipline which is ideal to help information security 
professionals identify appropriate metrics and tune communications to an optimal 
level for a given audience. It is noted that most organisations should already have the 
prerequisite information to enable this approach including the existing relationship, 
contact details and demographics of their audience. Even if organisations do not 
have sufficient demographics for their information system users, these can be 
gathered using existing relationships. 
 
Finding Three: The Limited Impact of Awareness 
 
There are significant concerns about the extent to which information security 
awareness successfully promotes behavioural change. The detail of a study involving 
risk awareness is included in Appendix B. This study found very little impact to 
behaviour from introducing risk awareness, even when motivational factors should 
have contributed to risk avoidance behaviour.  
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The study goes some way to validating the concerns made by Jeff Bock-Brown [BBJ-
04] that awareness is not reliably translating into behavioural change. Unless there is 
a behavioural change there is no resulting risk reduction. Being aware of the 
information security risks but continuing the behaviour anyway does not result in a 
benefit for the organisation.  
 
Although other authors such as Monique Hogervorst [HM-08] and Rebecca Herold 
[HR-05] would disagree about the impact of information security awareness, no 
reliable evidence has been found to support their enthusiasm for information security 
awareness being “the most significant single defence measure…” [HM-08]. If 
effective information security was actually achieved their views might be true but 
there is no evidence that this is obtainable given the methods currently used.  
 
It is important to note that no training will ever be 100% effective at mitigating a 
human risk. People can only apply their training when they recognise a situation 
which calls for this training to be used. The model in Section 2.4 has demonstrated 
that lack of attendance, learning failures and behavioural barriers are among many 
reasons why awareness efforts will never be 100% effective. 
 
Finding Four: Excessive Fear Appeals 
 
Research in the discipline of Psychology has shown the importance of the human 
behaviour in response to fear. The “Boomerang Effect” is shown as significant when 
fear is used as a motivator. Organisations need to be aware that if the perceived 
ability of the individual responding to the risk is too low the result is likely to be a 
deliberate ignoring of the threat using cognitive coping mechanisms. 
 
Excessive fear is also associated with a decline in cognitive effectiveness. The 
example given was about memory performance but this applies to other cognitive 
tasks. The implication is that it might be possible to scare users with information 
security threats and risks to the extent that they perform mistakes in a usability 
context. 
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Finding Five: Risk Distortion through Human Perception of Risk 
 
Perception of risk has an important impact on the needs of risk communication. 
Chapter Three demonstrated the importance of identifying and measuring existing 
perceptions in the target audience. Shortcuts in thinking about risk, divergent 
interrelations of key words and variable attitudes can all distort an information 
security awareness message. There is no such thing as an “average” organisation so 
a best practice approach which does not sufficiently allow for its target audience may 
be ineffective. 
 
Research in public risk communication has shown the importance of checking the 
interpretation of key words and measuring the strength of associations to optimise 
communications plans. While perceptions and attitudes to risks such as safety have 
been extensively explored in the public domain with researchers such as Slovic [SP-
00] and Morgan [MM-02], this same level of research has not been applied to 
information security communications and is an area of significant potential research. 
 
A study was done as part of this thesis to gauge the extent to which mistaken beliefs 
about the meaning of information security words and differing attitudes might be 
effecting information security communication. Appendix A shows the result when a 
questionnaire was given to a Security Team, a Human Resources Team and an 
Accounts Payable Team within the same organisation.  
 
There were two interesting findings. Firstly while as to be expected the three teams 
showed differences, all three areas were also internally inconsistent. The meaning of 
key information security words (beliefs) were interpreted significantly differently within 
each team even before comparing to other teams.  
 
Secondly, a significant number of responders had conflicting beliefs. Some of the 
questions could not both be true such as Question Eight: “Internal threats pose a 
greater risk to the organisation than external threats” and Question Twelve: “External 
security threats pose a greater risk to the organisation than internal threats”. It is not 
understood why this would be the case. It is possible that the question order, 
sentence order or the availability heuristic is having an effect but more research is 
needed. 
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The study in Appendix A has demonstrated the importance of Morgan’s approach in 
clarifying the meaning of key words before proceeding with communication. It also 
illustrates the need to quantify and measure existing attitudes before communicating 
a set of rules. Chapter Three on Psychology noted the importance of morals and 
ethics for motivation. Attitudes have been defined as beliefs with a value judgement 
attached. Therefore, existing attitudes go a long way to explaining the moral 
perspectives of an audience. To change the behaviour of users taking work home 
(Question Seventeen) it is necessary to identify and challenge any supporting moral 
judgements (for example working overtime is more important than information 
confidentiality). It is only by addressing the underlying moral judgement that a 
request for compliance will become reliably effective unless the sanction is severe. 
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Summary 
 
This thesis set out to help improve the effectiveness of information security 
awareness through an understanding of Psychology and Marketing principles. 
 
A review of Psychology and Marketing principles shows significant opportunities for a 
more holistic approach to communicating information security awareness. However, 
the lack of reliable metrics has been identified as a common barrier for demonstrating 
the effectiveness of these alternate methods. The Mental Models method in particular 
shows significant promise in mapping existing audience beliefs and attitudes. 
 
Two models were created as part of this thesis. The first one in Chapter Two 
illustrates the steps involved in achieving a behavioural change and shows how 
many potential barriers need to be considered when promoting a behaviour change 
through awareness.  
 
The second model in Chapter Five is a scorecard that information security 
professionals can use to evaluate the extent to which an information security 
awareness campaign takes into account Psychology and Marketing principles which 
are likely indicators of success.  
 
While both models offer significant opportunities to help refine approaches to 
information security awareness it will be difficult to quantify the benefit until 
improvements are made to the way that organisations measure success. 
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7. Appendix A: Sample Information Security Mental Models 
Questionnaire 
 
Purpose: 
 
Chapter Three discussed the importance that Morgan [MM-02] placed on measuring 
the strengths of existing beliefs and attitudes as a precursor to communication 
activities. A study was completed to examine the extent to which information security 
attitudes and beliefs might be divergent within a large UK organisation. 
 
Method: 
 
A set of twenty questions was created using the methodology recommended by 
Morgan. These questions included measuring the strength of beliefs such as “A risk 
is the same thing as a threat” and attitudes such as “I should consider someone’s 
motivations before reporting them for suspected breaches of information security 
policy”. 
 
Three teams within the organisation were invited to respond to the survey: 
• The Information Security Team 
• The Human Resources Team 
• The Accounts Payable Team 
 
Answers could const of one of five responses: 
• True 
• Probably True 
• Neutral / Unsure 
• Probably False 
• False 
 
Sample Information Security Mental Models Questionnaire 
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Information Security Mental Models Questionnaire: 
 
# Proposition 
F
als
e
 
P
rob
ably
 
F
als
e
 
D
o
n
’t
 K
n
o
w
 
P
rob
ably
 
T
ru
e
 
T
ru
e
 
1 
Information security is mainly about protecting computers from 
hackers on the internet 
     
2 A risk is the same thing as a threat      
3 A firewall prevents most information security risks      
4 Complicated passwords keep computers safe from hackers      
5 
Viruses and worms normally infect a computer from infected 
emails 
     
6 I have a good understanding of information security risks      
7 Most information security breaches are caused by viruses      
8 
 
Internal threats pose a greater risk to the organisation than 
external threats 
     
9 
Most of the information security risk for the organisation 
comes from employees using the internet 
     
10 Information security is the same as information safety      
11 
Hackers on the internet are the greatest threat to the 
organisation 
     
12 
External security threats pose a greater risk to the 
organisation than internal threats 
     
13 It is the goal of this organisation to be reasonably secure      
14 It is the goal of this organisation to be completely secure      
15 
It is the goal of this organisation to be 100% compliant with 
the Data Protection Act 
     
16 
Excessive use of the internet during work time is a security 
problem 
     
17 
Taking computer files home to work on a home computer is a 
security breach 
     
18 
I should consider someone’s motivations before reporting 
them for suspected breaches of information security policy 
     
19 Everyone is responsible for information security      
20 Most breaches of information security are caused by accident      
 
Information Security Mental Models Questionnaire © Geordie Stewart
Sample Information Security Mental Models Questionnaire 
© Geordie Stewart 2008 Page 91 of 104 
Results: 
 
The results were surprising in that while differences were expected between the 
teams, the teams were also internally inconsistent.  
 
Firstly, the interpretation of words was shown to be problematic. Question Two tested 
the perception of the words “Threat” and “Risk” with the statement: “A risk is the 
same thing as a threat”. Even within the Information Security Team there was a 
significant divergence, indicating that there were different beliefs about the meaning 
of the concept of “Threat” and “Risk”. This is surprising given that information security 
were the technical specialists in this language domain. 
 
Within the Human Resources Team there was also a divergent range of perceptions 
about “Threats” and “Risks”. Faced with uncertainty in a subject matter outside of 
their expertise, most of the Human Resources responses might have been expected 
to be neutral or “Probably False” or “Probably True”. Instead, 37% of responses 
professed to be sure that the answer was either “True” or “False”. The difference 
between “Probably True” and “True” is the degree of certainty. The individuals who 
answered “True” may not be aware that they are mistaken.  
 
The clear implication from this observation is that defining key terms such as 
“Threats” or “Risks” needs to take place before any communications take place. An 
awareness campaign communicating ways to control or reduce risk is unlikely to be 
effective if the target audience fundamentally misunderstands the concept of what a 
“Risk” is. Part of the initial communication might be to define exactly what the 
organisation defines a “Threat” to be. 
 
Question 17 tested an attitude: “Taking computer files home to work on a home 
computer is a security breach”. The results were split down the middle for the 
information security team. Half the team said that it was a security breach and half 
the team said it wasn’t. Potentially, this could be contributing to mixed messages in 
information security communications. 
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The following graph shows the average results for the three teams: 
 
Beliefs and Attitudes Survey Results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Question Number
True
Probably True
Neutral
Probably False
False
Security Response HR Response Accounts Response
 
 
Beliefs and attitudes survey © Geordie Stewart
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8. Appendix B: Euston Road Warning Signs 
 
Window cleaners operating at number 250 Euston Road in London led to an 
opportunity to study a human response to risk communications. Originally, this thesis 
was not going to include a study with a large number of subjects but this situation 
presented an ideal opportunity to observe how people responded to risk awareness 
in an everyday setting without necessarily being aware that they were being 
observed. 
 
The window cleaners were operating on scaffolding above a busy footpath and six 
warning signs had been deployed in a row directly underneath. As laid out, the signs 
divided approximately 1/3rd of the footpath space directly under the cleaners. 
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The signs were apparently intended to communicate a safety hazard with the 
apparent expectation that pedestrians would avoid walking underneath. The signs 
were yellow, high visibility with clear black text including the word “Danger” 
prominently displayed: 
 
 
 
Purpose 
To measure the impact caused by the presence of the signs. Of interest would be the 
extent to which the signs communicated an awareness of a risk that would have an 
effect on how pedestrians chose to use the sidewalk. 
 
Method 
For a period of 30 minutes the following events were counted: 
• The number of pedestrians walking inside the line of cones and under 
the hazard. 
• The number of pedestrians walking outside the line of cones and away 
from the hazard. 
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• The number of pedestrians who looked up to check what the signs 
were referring to. 
 
As a control comparison, the experiment was repeated at 4.30pm later that day when 
the signs had been removed.  The distribution and number of pedestrians was 
counted again to evaluate the effect the signs had on how the sidewalk was used. 
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Results: 
9.15am – 9.45am 
 
 Number % 
Pedestrians walking inside the Cones (under the window 
cleaners) 
36 29 
Pedestrians walking outside the Cones (away from the window 
cleaners) 
89 71 
Total number of pedestrians 125 100 
 
Only three pedestrians looked up to see what the signs were referring to. Two of the 
pedestrians were walking inside the cones and under the window cleaners and one 
of the pedestrians was walking outside the coned area. None of the three changed 
their direction on the footpath after observing the window cleaners above. 
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4.30pm – 5.00pm 
 
 Number % 
Pedestrians walking under where the window cleaners had been 43 31 
Pedestrians walking outside the area which had been marked by 
cones 
96 69 
Total number of pedestrians 139 100 
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Analysis: 
 
The difference between the warning cones being present or not amounted to only a 
2% influence on how pedestrians used the pavement. This difference is statistically 
insignificant and is unexpected given the assumed motivation for pedestrians to 
avoid personal safety risk. 
 
While the 2% difference is interesting it is also significant how few people looked up 
to see what the danger signs were referring to. Of the two pedestrians who looked up 
while taking a path which took them under the window cleaners, neither changed 
course to manage the potential danger of falling objects. 
 
The results are surprising because of the ingredients present to communicate risk: 
• The bright yellow, highly visible danger signs 
• The reference to the threat “Men Working Overhead” 
• A visible threat in the form of a hanging window cleaner basket some five 
meters above 
 
Measuring pavement use later that day was necessary in order to account for 
patterns of how people used the pavement. Potentially, preferences for walking 
closer or further away from the road would have been an unknown variable.  
 
Potentially, morning pedestrians use the pavement differently than afternoon 
pedestrians and an improvement would have been to do the test at the same time on 
a consecutive day. 
 
It’s not clear from the results how many pedestrians were actually aware of the risk. 
The results show that there was little if any significant impact on behaviour caused by 
the presence of the warning signs. What the results don’t show is how many 
pedestrians received the risk communication component successfully and how many 
lacked sufficient cognitive focus or motivation to act on their awareness. To find out if 
pedestrians walking under the window cleaners were conscious of the risk 
communication it would have been necessary to stop them and ask after walking 
under if they recalled a warning sign and what it said. 
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Another possible explanation for the low impact on behaviour is that pedestrians 
inherently felt “safe” walking down a busy street. It might be that there was a 
perceived safety in numbers which influenced the level of threat that pedestrians 
recognised.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
This study has demonstrated an example of how communicating awareness does not 
necessarily result in behavioural change. In this case the behavioural change 
required to manage the risk was a very minor one – pedestrians only needed to walk 
a few steps on a different side of the pavement and significantly reduce the risk of 
falling objects. 
 
It is surprising how many pedestrians did not make an effort to walk outside of the 
danger area. The situation had many of the ingredients discussed in Chapter Three 
for promoting behavioural change – a risk posed directly to the individual, eye 
catching communication and a high level of personal efficacy to deal with the risk.  
 
Potentially, the level of cognition given to the evaluation of the risk had an impact. 
Would it have made a difference if the signs were more specific about the threat e.g.: 
“Danger of Falling Objects!”? What if pedestrians were asked to walk under the 
window cleaners? How many might refuse after devoting specific attention to the 
threat. You as a reader are encouraged to consider if you would have chosen to walk 
under the window cleaners after walking past the warning cones. After a discussion 
of the risks and a period of cognitive focus on the issue do you think you would have 
behaved differently to the pedestrians in the experiment? 
 
More research in the area of risk communication is required. It would have been ideal 
in this experiment to find out the extent to which pedestrians noticed and cognitively 
processed the signs but decided implicitly or explicitly not to change their behaviour. 
This would have required interviews for the pedestrians involved. 
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